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This research investigates vulnerability to mortality from a pandemic by creating a novel spatio-
temporal epidemiological model that will simulate a pandemic and subsequent attempts by the population 
to access health care throughout the course of the simulated pandemic. Despite extensive and on-going 
research on pandemic influenza preparedness planning, there is a surprising dearth of literature regarding 
who is most at risk to dying from influenza, where this risk is concentrated, and why. The results of this 
study suggest that should a pandemic comparable to the 1918 Spanish Flu happen today, when the 
differentiating effects of receiving health care are considered, the mortality impacts of such a pandemic 
would be worse than what would be expected based on historical rates alone. This research provides 
evidence of the potential deadly impacts of a pandemic when the health care system is unable to provide 















“Unless someone like you  
cares a whole awful lot,  
nothing is going to get better.  
It’s not.”  
-Dr. Seuss, The Lorax 
 
I dedicate this thesis to those who died during the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic. In a time where the world 
was consumed by grief and fear, many of them went unnamed and unremembered. They are the most 
essential contributors to this research. 
I also dedicate this thesis to those who have died from other pandemics: influenzas, HIV/AIDS, and 
SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19. Though they are rare, they are also deadly. May we as researchers, 
policymakers, and citizens of humanity, learn from the mistakes that were made. And when we know 
better, may we do better.  
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Writing a thesis about pandemic mortality is a hard thing to do. You spend each day thinking about 
death; who already died; who might die; and how to design a pandemic so that just the right amount of 
people die. Not too few, or you won’t have a results section. Not too many, or you’ll end up with the 
apocalypse instead of a results section. You have to divorce the numbers on your screen from the real 
people in the world. Your reference population isn’t the people who live on your street, they’re just 
numbers put into an Excel spreadsheet by someone at the Census Bureau. Case-mortality rates don’t 
represent gravestones, they’re just values in a table on a page written out by someone a long time ago. 
The red spaces on your maps aren’t towns and cities and counties, they’re just pixels. You have to remove 
humanity from your analysis, or you’ll never finish your project.  
Writing a thesis about pandemic mortality during a pandemic is even harder. Suddenly, those 
numbers in your Excel spreadsheet are connected to names and faces. Sometimes, those names and faces 
belonged to people that you knew and loved. The case-mortality rates change with each new gravestone 
and you end up being the one writing out a new table. The red spaces on your maps are towns and cities 
and counties, and then one day one of those red spaces is the town that you live in. A few days later, your 
university tells you to leave campus and remain in your house until further notice. Now you’re at home, 
completely alone, trying to finish a thesis project on pandemic mortality that you started two years ago 
when the idea of a pandemic was still something that would probably happen eventually, but it wouldn’t 
be any time soon, and you’d be prepared for it by the time it happened. The news makes it sound like it 
actually is the apocalypse; you’re afraid to go to the store but you need food; and you’re sniffing candles 
compulsively to make sure you haven’t lost your sense of smell because you’ve heard that’s an early 
symptom of infection. The hospitals are already starting to run out of space; people are dying in the 
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hallways, and it’s only been a few weeks. There’s no test available, so there’s no way to know who is 
infected and who isn’t. Doctors are getting sick because they don’t have face masks. Nurses are wearing 
trash bags because there’s no PPE available. You hear that New York City is running out of body bags, 
and you see drone footage of them digging mass graves in the old potter’s field on Hart Island, but at least 
that replaced the plan of mass graves in Central Park. There’s no toilet paper, because absurdity has 
become the standard. You’re watching the maps of new infections published every day start to mirror the 
maps of your simulated pandemic, the epidemic curves look suspiciously like the ones you created last 
year, and the hospital capacity parameters being published suggest that you probably overestimated how 
much space there would be in health care facilities if something like this were to happen. And then, 
you’re forced to confront the humanity that permeates every letter and number and inch of map in your 
project.  
Whether we realize it or not, research is never just numbers and figures and words. It is the real 
world, simplified so that we might answer some question, but it remains real nonetheless. The “real 
world” is messy and unpredictable and can change in an instant. When I started this research, I had hopes 
that doing calculations of hospital capacity and making maps of mortality could motivate some small 
action that looked to prepare for the future, even if it was just in the places that I used as study sites. I 
never anticipated that the “next” pandemic would actually happen before I even finished writing the 
paper. The “real world” changes quickly, and as researchers we have to try our very best to keep up with 
it.   
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-
2/COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic. I was writing the discussion section of this paper, and I had to 
go back and re-write some of what I had already written because things had changed. The defense of this 
thesis was April 3, 2020. In those 23 days, I learned more about the realities of research and the realities 
of a pandemic than I had in the two years prior I spent thinking about, designing, and carrying out this 
project. I learned that despite all of our preparations, we were wildly unprepared for something like this to 
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happen. Despite all of the research and Ted Talks and books and papers and models and war-gaming and 
months of advance warning and the highest score in the world on the Global Health Security Index (83.5), 
when the U.S. was finally tested by this virus, we failed. I’ve spent a lot of time reflecting on this failure 
in the context of my own research.  
I could probably write an entire book about the lessons I learned during this process. Prior to March 
2020, the lessons had been primarily been about how to conduct good research and design models, write 
papers, and apply for grants: standard grad school stuff. Perhaps the biggest lesson I have learned is the 
importance of the assumptions we make in our models. Until March 11, 2020, I had never written 
“coordination at federal, state, and local levels to allow for different hospitals and health systems to work 
together” or “federal funding” or “accurate and reliable testing” as assumptions for a model. They were 
assumptions, of course, but not the kind that I ever actively thought about. And I was not alone in these 
taken-for-granted assumptions. A researcher at Georgetown University who was interviewed by The 
Atlantic on March 25, 2020 said that she was “not aware of any simulations that [she] or others have run 
where [they] considered a failure of testing.” It just didn’t seem to be within the realm of possibility, but it 
happened anyways. It is a privilege, and a bias that we unconsciously build into our models, to assume 
that we will have the infrastructure and funding and political will to effectively respond to a health threat 
like a pandemic. It’s also an assumption with little historical basis. History saw the same failure of 
response during the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic and during the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 1918, the 
government deliberately misled the public about the severity of the pandemic in order to preserve support 
for World War I. During the devastating beginnings of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, the government 
pretended it just wasn’t happening. These pandemics were two of the deadliest events in human history.  
We have to design research that reflects reality, even when it doesn’t neatly fit into the contours of 
our thinking. We cannot check our humanity at the laboratory door; it is imperative that we remember that 
each number in a simulated count of the dead could potentially be a real person. This doesn’t mean that 
we shouldn’t estimate these things; it means that we better make sure that we’re estimating correctly. We 
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should be careful with the assumptions that we build into our research, especially when the assumptions 
are about things that ultimately can be the difference between life and death. The models that we, as 
researchers, build during events such as a pandemic are often the only tools we have for anticipating what 
is to come. We have a responsibility to construct them as accurately as we can, even when accurate 
assumptions cast an unflattering light. Real human lives are lost every time we fail to measure up to the 
challenge presented to us by a pandemic. Each time, we are caught off guard, and this pandemic should 
be the last one to find us unprepared. I don’t have all of the answers, but I present this thesis as one small 
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Unlike other infectious diseases, in which socio-economic status may make you more or less 
susceptible to contracting the disease, influenza is largely an “equal opportunity” infection. Anyone can 
be infected at any time. Because of the highly infectious nature of the virus and the natural susceptibility 
of the human population (without vaccination), the United States often experiences a seasonal influenza 
epidemic. Influenza viruses circulate year-round, however, most of the cases in the United States occur 
between December and February (CDC, 2017). In most patients, seasonal influenza can be treated with 
antiviral drugs, which lessen symptoms and shorten the time an individual feels ill by several days (CDC, 
n.d.). However, serious cases of influenza may require hospitalization and usage of a ventilator and may 
potentially be fatal. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that seasonal 
influenza in the United States results in between 9.2 million and 35.6 million illnesses, between 140,000 
and 710,000 hospitalizations, and between 12,000 and 56,000 deaths annually (CDC, 2017). The actual 
impact rates of seasonal influenza vary greatly from year to year based on the strain of influenza virus that 
has become epidemic during that season. 
Every once in a while, a different type of influenza virus emerges; a virus that is both a result of 
natural genetic variation and unlike any other circulating strain. The strain is entirely novel, in that there 
is no vaccine available to combat diffusion and it is so dissimilar from any previously circulating strain 
that there is no residual immunity in the human population. This unique variation in viral strain is the 
greatest contributor to occurrences of pandemic influenza (Monto et al., 2006). Because there is so little 
existing immunity in the human population, the attack rate for this virus will be much higher than that of 
a typical influenza virus and many people will become ill. A majority of people will be able to transmit 
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the virus before they realize they have been infected, and some individuals will experience very few 
symptoms despite spreading the virus. Though rare, what may have started as a small outbreak or even a 
local epidemic of a novel influenza virus can quickly become a pandemic. Demographic groups that are 
considered “high-risk”, such as young children and the elderly, are the most likely to have serious 
complications from influenza infection. However, an entirely novel virus could change who is affected, 
how strongly they are affected, who needs medical care, the type of care that is needed, and the volume of 
care that is required. When compared to a typical seasonal influenza epidemic, a novel influenza strain 
that becomes pandemic could increase death rates by more than 56% (CDC,2017) quickly overwhelming 
health care systems and having catastrophic consequences. 
Though the initial risk of contracting pandemic influenza may be more or less the same on a 
population level, the risk of mortality may not be. An entirely novel virus could change who is affected, 
how strongly they are affected, who needs medical care, the kind of care that is needed, and the volume of 
care that is required. Should a pandemic comparable to the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic occur today, rates 
of both infection and death would likely greatly exceed typical rates of seasonal influenza. Because the 
population today is much larger and demographically more varied, it is likely that these rates would also 
surpass those of all three pandemics of the twentieth century and potentially the 2009 H1N1 swine 
influenza pandemic. Though this seems like a doomsday scenario, it is not as hyperbolic as one would 
think. The influenza-like-illness (ILI) activity level (or percent of overall visits to a healthcare facility 
attributed to influenza) for the 2017-2018 seasonal influenza epidemic was 7.7%. The peak ILI level for 






RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
This study will examine the states of North Carolina and Alabama to achieve the following research 
objectives: 
o Objective 1: Using a newly developed model, determine where individuals are most 
vulnerable to dying from influenza. 
 Sub-question (Q)1.1: What is the expected case-mortality rate, based on 1918 
case-mortality rates, with no modeled hospitalizations? 
 Q1.2: What is the new expected mortality rate for a new influenza pandemic, 
given the modeled circumstances? 
 Q1.3: What is the distribution pattern of case-mortality rates? 
 Q1.4: Is increased vulnerability concentrated anywhere? 
o Objective 2: Investigate how modeled vulnerability to pandemic flu mortality in the U.S. 
is related to the spatial variation of population characteristics and access to health care. 
 Q2.1: What is the relationship between traditional socioeconomic indicators of 
vulnerability and modeled mortality? 
 Q2.2: How does socio-economic vulnerability to mortality from pandemic 
influenza correspond to spatial vulnerability to pandemic influenza? 
o Objective 3: Determine if the modeled fatality distribution is similar to actual flu 
mortality distributions. 
 Q3.1: Where are actual influenza deaths located? 





BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
INFLUENZA 
Influenza, or flu, is a contagious respiratory illness caused by infection of the nose, throat, and lungs 
by an influenza virus. Infection can cause mild to severe illness, with serious cases requiring 
hospitalization and potentially resulting in death (CDC,2018). Influenza is highly contagious; it is spread 
through droplets emitted when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks, and can be spread to others 
from a distance of up to six feet (CDC, 2017). Symptoms of influenza infection typically develop 1-4 
days after exposure, and infected individuals are able to spread the virus to others beginning at ~1 day 
before the onset of symptoms and ~5-7 days after becoming ill (CDC, 2017). There are four types of 
influenza viruses, classified by antigenic type. Influenza A and B viruses are known as Human Influenza 
and cause seasonal epidemics. Influenza C typically causes only a mild respiratory illness in hosts, and 
Influenza D is not known to infect humans. Influenza A viruses are further classified based on two 
proteins found on the outer surface of the viral envelope, hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N), and 
the genetic strain. Influenza B is not classified by surface proteins, but is classified by lineage and strain 
(CDC, 2017). 
Because of the highly infectious nature of the virus and the natural susceptibility of the human 
population (without vaccination), the United States often experiences a seasonal influenza pandemic. 
Influenza viruses circulate year-round, however, most of the cases of influenza in the United States occur 
between December and February (CDC, 2017). In most patients, seasonal influenza can be treated with 
antiviral drugs, which lessen symptoms and shorten the time an individual feels ill by several days (CDC, 
n.d.). Serious cases of influenza may require hospitalization and usage of a ventilator and may potentially 
be fatal. The actual impact rates of seasonal influenza vary greatly from year-to-year based on the strain 
of influenza virus that has become epidemic during that season. 
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A seasonal influenza epidemic is typically caused by a virus that is a slightly mutated version of the 
virus from the previous year’s seasonal epidemic (CDC, 2017), resulting in a level of residual immunity 
in the population. Residual immunity occurs when an individual has been exposed to and developed an 
immune response to a virus and this prior exposure is similar enough to a new virus to offer some level of 
immune protection, although the protection is often lessened (Medina et al., 2010; Pérez-Trallero et al., 
2009).   
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
Historically, pandemic influenza has been caused by an outbreak of a novel strain of Influenza A. 
Novel strains of influenza typically arise from one of two mechanisms: gene reassortment between human 
influenza viruses and animal influenza viruses or genome adaptation (Morens & Fauci, 2007). This new 
virus must be able to infect a human population easily, be easily transmissible among humans in an 
efficient and sustained fashion, and the population must have little or no pre-existing immunity (CDC,” 
2017). Pandemic influenza is rare; there have been four influenza pandemics since 1900; taking place in 
1918, 1957, 1968, and 2009 (CDC, 2017). The 2009 H1N1 influenza A pandemic, known colloquially as 
“swine flu”, was first detected in the United States (CDC, 2017) and is the most recent influenza 
pandemic at the time of this writing.  
However, the 1918 H1N1 influenza A pandemic, or the “Spanish Flu” pandemic, is probably the most 
well-known. About one-third of the world’s population became infected and more than 50 million people 
worldwide died as a result of infection ((Morens & Fauci, 2007), making it is among the deadliest events 
in human history (Morens & Fauci, 2007; CDC, 2017). An estimated 50- 100 million people worldwide 
died during this pandemic. The 1918 Spanish Flu virus was a strain of subtype A(H1N1) virus, and was 
the base virus from which genetic reassortment of descendent strains produced the 1957 and 2009 
pandemics (Medina et al., 2010; Morens & Fauci, 2007).  
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In 1968, a new H3N2 influenza virus emerged to pandemic proportions, and has since become 
endemic in human populations. Demographic groups that are considered “high-risk”, such as young 
children and the elderly, are typically believed to be most likely to have serious complications from 
influenza. However, an entirely novel virus could change who is affected, how strongly they are affected, 
who needs medical care, the kind of care that is needed, and the volume of care that is required. The 1918 
Spanish Influenza virus killed more young adults (25-29 years old) than any other age group (Barry, 
2004; Gagnon et al., 2013). The exact reason why is not definitively known, but one potential theory is 
that the excess mortality is this age group was due in part to an overreaction of the immune system known 
as a cytokine storm. Cytokines are a protein created by various immune cells, including macrophages, B 
lymphocytes, T lymphocytes, and mast cells (Lackie, 2010; Stedman, 2005). They are involved in a 
normal immune response to a pathogen; they act as chemical messengers to stimulate increased 
production of its parent immune cell and guide more of the immune cells to the pathogen. Because the 
immune cells release cytokines that stimulate the production of immune cells which in turn release more 
cytokines, this results in a type of positive feedback loop that can severely damage the lungs and kidneys 
and sometimes lead to death (Lackie, 2010; Stedman, 2005). Because cytokine production and release is a 
function of a healthy immune system, individuals with the most robust immune systems are at highest risk 
of experiencing a cytokine storm; this is typically young adults. The overreaction is caused in part by the 
complete novelty of the virus. Due to pandemic cycles and the evolutionary nature of the influenza 
viruses as descendent strains of one another, young adults typically lack any kind of preexisting or 
residual immunity whereas elderly adults have been exposed to various strains of influenza during their 
lifetimes (Gagnon et al., 2013). Thus, contrary to widely held understandings of medical vulnerability and 
biological vulnerability to influenza, young adults have a particularly high risk of dying from pandemic 
influenza infection. 
The initial level of risk is null without exposure, making physical location and population density 
important mitigating variables when assessing risk.  Physical location and population density can also 
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influence the ability of an individual to get health care, dependent upon the distance one has to travel to 
services and the amount of competition for services. Additionally, socio-economic status and 
demographic characteristics can influence both an individual’s likelihood of infection and their ability to 
get health care. It is through these varying mechanisms of socio- economic stratification and geographic 
location that the risk of exposure, clinically apparent illness, and mortality from pandemic influenza is 
enhanced or suppressed, leaving certain populations more vulnerable than others.  
Risk is the quantitative assessment of the likelihood of experiencing some outcome, written as:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 = 1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖∗𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
This is a unitless measure of risk, and would provide a measure that would be interpreted as “The risk 
of X outcome for Y person is Z.” This measure does not provide much information; it does not tell us 
why the individual might have that particular risk, what could be exacerbating the risk, or how the risk 





 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒   
where 
 Outcome No Outcome 
Exposed A B 
Unexposed C C 
 
(Westreich, 2019) 
This measure can then be turned into a Risk Difference or Risk Ratio calculation, detailing how much 
more likely the exposed group is to experience the outcome when compared to the unexposed group. 
However, this risk measure only provides information on how likely an individual is to experience a 
particular outcome, given their exposure status. This can be useful during pandemic times in assessing 
how much more likely outcomes like pneumonia and death are when an individual has been exposed to 
the virus, but it still does not provide information on why the individual may have such a likelihood.  
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For pandemic influenza, risk can be calculated for a variety of outcomes, including risk of exposure, 
risk of clinically apparent infection, risk of pneumonia, and risk of fatality. But, because risk is a purely 
quantitative measure, it fails to account for additional external factors that may be influencing one’s 
outcome. This is the strength of assessing vulnerability in addition to risk. Vulnerability is a holistic 
measure; it can be assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. It allows for the assessment of the 
external factors, such as how a lack of health insurance might prohibit an individual from seeking health 
care, thus increasing their risk of a fatal outcome from pandemic influenza.  
PANDEMIC FLU IMPACTS 
It is likely that a novel influenza pandemic would quickly overwhelm the health care system of the 
U.S. ((Daugherty et al., 2010) An influenza outbreak of any size, pandemic or not, has the potential to 
overwhelm health care facilities, and often does (Karlamangla, 2018; KTVZ, 2019). Available ventilators 
would quickly be exceeded by the magnitude of need; currently, there are about 105,000 ventilators in the 
United States and between 75,000 and 85,000 are in use at any given time. A traditional seasonal flu 
requires over 100,000 ventilators, and a pandemic flu would potentially require two- or three- times as 
many (Osterholm, 2005). A 2005 study of the potential impacts of pandemic influenza on critical services 
in England (Menon et al., 2005) found that demand for hospital beds may exceed available hospital beds 
by more than 230%, even when not accounting for prevailing occupancy of beds by non-influenza 
patients. In a worst-case scenario, such as that caused by an influenza pandemic, a gap of this size 
between the magnitude of need and the ability to provide care can and often will result in excess 
mortality. If the case fatality rate of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic, 2.5%, were applied to the 2016 
United States population, the mortality count would exceed 8 million people; this is roughly equivalent to 
the entire population of Virginia (Brundage, 2006). 
PANDEMIC FLU PREPAREDNESS PLANNING 
Of the four pandemics since the start of the 20th century, as well as other non-influenza pandemics, 
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the 1918 influenza pandemic is still considered to be the deadliest disease pandemic in history (Medina 
et al., 2010; Morens & Fauci, 2007). Due to its severity and unprecedented impact on the global 
population, pandemic preparedness plans written today employ the 1918 pandemic as the standard of 
influenza pandemics for which to prepare. Though the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic remains the 
foundation of pandemic preparedness planning, impacts of other pandemics and severe influenza 
epidemics have been incorporated into pandemic preparedness planning. The 1997 outbreak of 
A(H5N1) avian influenza in humans in Hong Kong catalyzed an increase in pandemic preparedness 
planning (U.S. Homeland Security Council, n.d.) as evidence suggests that the 1918 Spanish Influenza 
virus emerged from an avian-adapted influenza virus to become easily transmissible in human 
populations (Tumpey et al., 2005). Although A(H5N1) avian influenza is not easily transmitted from 
person to person (Chan, 2002; WHO, n.d.), this was the first emergence of A(H5N1) avian influenza as 
a zoonotic disease capable of making the jump from animals to humans and there have been several 
human outbreaks since the initial spillover (Chan, 2002; Germann et al., 2006). Now endemic in avian 
hosts globally, (NEJM, n.d.; Bradt & Drummond, 2006; Chan, 2002) it has been integrated into 
pandemic influenza preparedness plans alongside the A(H1N1)pdm09 swine influenza virus that caused 
the 2009 pandemic, as well as other mammalian and avian influenza viruses that pose a risk to human 
populations. 
Following the 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic, many national governments and 
intergovernmental agencies developed Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans. The primary influenza 
pandemic preparedness documents in the United States are the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza (U.S. Homeland Security Council, n.d.) and the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation Plan (U.S. Homeland Security Council, n.d.), created by the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. There are also supplementary documents 
created by the Department of Health and Human Services, the CDC, and the Homeland Security 
Council that address the role of the private business sector in an influenza pandemic situation and non-
pharmaceutical interventions to be deployed at a community level. These documents are almost 
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universally focused on vaccine development and distribution, but do little more than affirm the need 
for a vaccine to be developed and distributed should a novel influenza strain emerge. There is 
currently an effort being led by the Pandemic Influenza Programme at the World Health Organization 
to have governments codify a vaccination plan for health care workers, but this again relies upon the 
development of a vaccine in a timely manner.  
 
There are several limitations to forming pandemic influenza preparedness plans based primarily on the 
potential development of a vaccine:  
 
(1) The vaccine could be ineffective, as evidenced by the failed monovalent swine flu vaccine 
developed in response to the outbreak at Ft. Dix in 1976 (Andimann, 2018). Vaccines are 
never 100% effective to begin with, but with the production timeline that a pandemic would 
necessitate, the likelihood of efficacy drops due to shortened time for research, development, 
and trial.  
(2) There is likely to be an extremely limited supply of vaccine due to the nature of influenza 
vaccine production using eggs, the procurement of which is limited by the capacity of the 
poultry industry to produce them. More and more frequently, seasonal flu vaccines are 
running short, so a need for even more vaccines during a pandemic is likely to go unfulfilled.  
(3) These plans do not detail any actual method for distributing the vaccine. There is no 
discussion of who should be prioritized for vaccination other than healthcare workers. The 
plans do not outline where or how vaccines should be distributed (for example, ring 
vaccination, contact-trace vaccination, etc.) and there is no guidance on how such decisions 





DISEASE ECOLOGY  
In order to fully understand how an infectious disease can become a pandemic, we have to first 
understand the diseases themselves. Not necessarily the biology of the pathogens, but rather the 
ecosystem in which the pathogen proliferates and how it proliferates. The Triangle of Disease Ecology 
(Meade, 1977) provides a framework for this understanding. This framework posits that there are three 
essential factors that interact to create a state of health or disease: the population, their behavior, and the 
environment. These three components make up the three corners of the triangle. Within each corner, we 
can create smaller triangles, themselves ecological frameworks for understanding each ecosystems-level 
component (Emch et al., 2017; Meade, 1977) (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – The Triangle of Disease Ecology 
 
In comparison, traditional epidemiology offers another framework for understanding causality of 
disease known as causal pies. In this framework, each pie is comprised of the components that contribute 
to the etiology of an individual instance of disease (Rothman, 2008). Unlike the Triangle of Disease 
Ecology, causal pies focus on individuals. The Triangle of Disease Ecology focuses on population-level 
human-environment interactions. Causal pies contain necessary cause components and sufficient cause 
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components, indicating what must be present in an individual to cause disease and what external factors 
make it easier to contract disease, respectively. Since causal pies do not indicate how such components 
may have interacted, they are not overly useful on a population level. This is a gap in traditional Public 
Health knowledge and practice that Disease Ecology can fill, especially when it comes to our 
understanding of infectious diseases. A causal pie can state the specific etiology of a disease; however, 
the Triangle of Disease Ecology can explore the interacting variables to more fully explain the etiology 
across scales and populations. 
However, we cannot create one single Triangle to fully explain pandemic influenza, as pandemic 
influenza cannot be explained using one single set of explanatory interactions. Rather, pandemic 
influenza is a global-level health event, made up of a network of single states of health. In this way, 
pandemic influenza can be conceptualized as a large mosaic of interacting Triangles.  
At its inception, pandemic influenza is a result of the emergence of a novel influenza virus. This 
emergence likely happened in what is referred to as a spillover event. A spillover is defined as the 
moment when a pathogen passes from a member or members of its host species into a member or 
members of another species (Quammen, 2012). This single focused jump from one species to another is 
all it takes to start the process of viral adaptation to a new host. The original host, where the virus jumped 
from, then becomes the reservoir host. Often, reservoir hosts don’t show symptoms; the recipient of the 
newly spilled-over virus may not have even been aware that the host was infected. In some infectious 
diseases, the spillover event is between two hosts, and the receiving host quickly becomes symptomatic. 
Other times, and frequently in the case of influenza, there is an intermediary host, often referred to as the 
amplifier. The amplifier host comes into contact with the reservoir host, and the virus spills over. The 
amplifier may start to exhibit symptoms, but it is just as possible that it remains healthy. This amplifier 
host then comes into contact with the ultimate recipient host, which is often humans. It is speculated that 
this was the spillover process for the 1918 Spanish Flu. Evidence suggests that birds are the natural 
reservoir of influenza viruses (Andimann, 2018; Quammen, 2012), and at some point, maybe on a farm in 
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rural Kansas (Kolata, 2001) an infected bird came into contact with a susceptible pig. The nature of this 
contact is unknown, but it is speculated that it was a migratory flyover during which the virus was shed 
over the farm (Kolata, 2001). The pig became infected with this avian flu virus; however, pigs also have 
their own influenza viruses for which they are reservoir hosts. Influenza viruses are incredibly adaptable 
and mutate rapidly, and when the two viruses encountered each other in the cells of the infected pig, they 
underwent a viral mixing process known as antigenic shift, in which they switch RNA segments 
(Andimann, 2018) to create a brand new hybrid-type influenza virus. At some point, this infected pig (or 
more likely, infected pigs, as the original pig was very likely to infect his cohort) was in close enough 
contact with a susceptible human for this new virus to spillover again (Andimann, 2018; Quammen, 
2012). The rest is, quite literally, history.  
The idea that these components interact within an ecosystem is not a new concept. In the 1960s, 
Pavlovsky (Meade, 1977) wrote about the landscape of epidemiology; or the idea that animals, 
vegetation, insects, soil, precipitation and other climatic factors, and other elements of the natural 
landscape could influence the presence of infectious agents and the likelihood of their transmission. Each 
of these components, and the landscape itself, are vulnerable to change at the hands of human agency, and 
it is these changes that frequently create the conditions for disease transmission. The balance between the 
components as they exist in the natural, unaltered landscape, is what is referred to by Dubos as ecological 
equilibrium (Dubos, 1987). It is the disruption in ecological equilibrium, whether by human or natural 
causes, that facilitate some failure of the adaptive mechanisms of resistance (of humans, specifically, for 
this research) allowing for microbial infection (Dubos, 1987).  
Disruptions in ecological equilibrium that result in pandemic-level influenza infection could happen in the 
following ways (this is not an exhaustive list): 
(1) Spillover events due to human movement into previously undisturbed ecosystems (i.e. hunting, 
logging and other resource extraction, recreation, etc.). 
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(2) Contact between different animal hosts and/or the animal reservoir that would not have happened 
without human intervention (i.e. migratory birds flying over a farm), leading to spillover events. 
(3) Increases in population density due to increasing urbanization that allow sustained pathogen 
transmission.  
(4) Failures of infrastructure (i.e. overcrowded hospitals) that inhibit care and control of a novel 
influenza infection. 
Adaptive mechanisms of resistance are the mechanisms through which an organism resists microbial 
infection, whether they be biological or behavioral (Dubos, 1987). Dubos argues that adaptive 
mechanisms of resistance are environment specific and are refined during states of physiological 
normalcy for the host (1987). Adaptive mechanisms of resistance to (pandemic) influenza in humans 
include: 
(1) Innate, immunological, and biological: 
a. T-cells, antigens, white blood cells 
b. Cilia and mucous membranes 
c. Residual immunity from prior exposure  
d. Other immune responses, including pyrogens (fever), cytokines, etc.  
(2) External and built: 
a. Presence of and access to health care facilities 
b. Existence of and access to of medications 
c. Existence of, and access to vaccines 
(3) Behavioral: 
a. Proper use of medications 
b. Proper use of vaccines 
c. Proper hygiene techniques 
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d. Effective and proper quarantine practices  
e. Effective and proper responses to outbreaks of novel pathogens 
However, Dubos (1987) also argues that development has far outpaced human biological evolution, 
and we no longer live in a state of physiological normalcy. Thus, we no longer have adequate adaptive 
mechanisms of resistance. One of the primary conditions for pandemic influenza, or a pandemic of any 
infectious disease, is that there be no residual immunity in the population, rendering adaptive mechanisms 
1a-1d obsolete. Additionally, pathogens themselves also have adaptive mechanisms of resistance, as well 
as adaptive mechanisms of reproduction. Adaptive mechanisms of reproduction allow for the pathogen to 
evolve in response to the adaptive mechanisms of resistance in the host. An example of this is the recent 
development of drug resistant bacteria. Without these mechanisms, pathogens would not be able to 
continue proliferate in the manner in which they do.  
Adaptive mechanisms of resistance and reproduction in (pandemic) influenza viruses include 
antigenic shift and antigenic drift. These mechanisms must result in a pathogen with new properties to 
which the host population is not adapted. For influenza, these resultant pathogens are either entirely novel 
with a reassortment of genes to which humans have never been exposed, or they are mutated versions of 
pathogens to which humans have been exposed, but the mutations have provided them with novel 
properties. The former was the circumstances that resulted in the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, while the 
latter were the circumstances that preempted the 2009 Swine Flu pandemic (Andimann, 2018).  
Failure and success of adaptive mechanisms can also be transient or sustained. Examples of these for 
pandemic influenza can include, but are not limited to: 
(1) Chance co-infection of an animal host by two different flu viruses that results in antigenic 
shift, especially in instances where the animal may not have been exposed to one or both 
viruses without human intervention.  
(2) Temporary reduction in cilia effectiveness due to cold weather 
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(3) Poor mouth-covering techniques during a coughing fit 
(4) Systemic lack of health care in a region 
(5) Sustained presence of live animal markets within which different animals have close contact 
with one another  
Thus, when health is considered as a measure of adaptability, the concept of disease transforms from 
simply a biological entity that one either possesses or not, to a measure of the maladaptive interactions 
between the environment, the population, and their culture (Meade, 1977). In this way, pandemic 
influenza is the global state of health created by a composite of maladaptive interactions (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 - The Triangle of Disease Ecology for Pandemic Influenza 
 
ROLE OF GEOGRAPHY 
Medical and Health Geographers offer a unique contribution to the multidisciplinary field of public 
health via the spatially relational perspectives through which public health questions are investigated. 
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Medical and Health Geography is the arm of public health research from which methodologies for 
assessing spatial patterns of health and disease emerge, as well as the tools and theory with which to 
investigate them. Training in GIS platforms, and the theoretical background needed to effectively detect, 
visualize, and interpret spatial patterns of data contained in a GIS, come from the broader discipline of 
quantitative geography. Methodologies for contextualizing population-level experiences of health and 
disease within the space in which they take place are also offered by Medical and Health Geography. 
Medical and Health Geographers can also offer an understanding of the nuance of both space and place in 
how a state of health is formed, experienced, and altered. Taken together, these various approaches to 
Medical and Health Geography can offer context for otherwise purely etiological questions of population 
health that public health seeks to answer.  
A nuanced understanding of space is particularly important for assessing spatial accessibility to health 
care. Should there be a scenario in which large numbers of the population need care at the same time, 
comprehensive knowledge regarding the ability of affected individuals to get to services as well as the 
ability of the healthcare system to administer care to large numbers of people will be crucial.  
Although there is wide acknowledgement that space is an important component for understanding 
health care behavior, health care accessibility research has focused specifically on distance as an 
important variable in both access to health care services (Arcury et al., 2005; Joseph & Bantock, 1982; W. 
Luo & Wang, 2003) and utilization behavior (Arcury et al., 2005). However, previous research has also 
demonstrated a lack of association between geographic variables and acute health care visit behavior 
(Arcury et al., 2005; Gelberg et al., 2000), in that geographic distance may not influence an individual’s 
decision to seek out acute care services.  It is important to distinguish, though, that such research on 
access and utilization of health care services, whether for primary or acute care, has focused primarily on 
access and utilization behavior. In this study, access behavior was considered to be the same for all 
individuals in the study area, keeping with the findings of Gelberg, Andersen, & Leake (2000) that 
distance may not discourage an individual from seeking acute care services.  
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GEOGRAPHIC MODELING OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 
Container-based metrics, also known as supply-demand ratios, are among the simplest measures of 
spatial accessibility. A ‘container’, often a pre-existing boundary, is applied to the study area and 
individuals that are located within the container are assumed to utilize the healthcare facility within the 
study area. The count of services available at the facility is the supply, and the number of the individuals 
within the container become the demand, generating a measure of services available per individual. 
However, this metric fails to consider the theoretical nature of boundaries. If the container boundary is a 
county line, for example, individuals who may be located on the border of two counties may not seek 
care at the facility assigned to their container, but may instead access a facility in the adjoining county 
because it is physically closer to them. Additionally, this metric is reliant on the size and location of the 
container to generate its measure of accessibility. The ratio of services per individual at one facility will 
vary drastically between a container large enough to capture 1000 people and a container only large 
enough to capture 10 people. The location of the container boundaries also directly influence the metric, 
as boundaries can be moved to include or exclude individuals from the service area of the facility, 
altering the resulting ratio. 
Hansen (1959) developed a gravity model to investigate potential spatial accessibility, originally 
intended to examine the ways in which access to employment shapes land use around metropolitan 
areas. In the Hansen model, access is defined as the potential for opportunities for interaction (Hansen, 
1959). Access, then, is a generalization of the relationship between the population of an area and the 
distance they must travel to take advantage of the opportunity being studied. This model operationalizes 
access as a measure of the spatial distribution of the opportunities, and this distribution is adjusted for 









1A2 is a relative measure of the accessibility at point 1 to the opportunity at point 2 
S2 is the size of the opportunity at point 2 
T1-2 is the travel time or distance between point 1 and point 2 
x is an exponent describing the effect of the travel time or distance between point 1 and point 2 
(Hansen, 1959) 
 
Access (A) at point 1 to the opportunity at point 2 is directly proportional to the size (S) of the 
opportunity and is inversely proportional to some function of the distance (x) separating point 1 from 
point 2. The total accessibility experienced by individuals located at point 1 is defined by the 
summation of the accessibility measures to each of the opportunities in the study. The function of 
distance (x) is an attempt to capture the notion that an individual’s willingness to traverse a distance is 
dependent upon the purpose of the travel. Hansen proposed exponents of 2.20 for work-related travel, 
2.35 for social travel, and 3.00 for shopping-related travel. The function of distance does not include a 
function of distance for healthcare-related travel, thus making the original gravity-based model less 
than optimal for visualizing population access to healthcare services.  
Joseph and Bantock (1982) were among the first researchers to apply measures of potential 
accessibility to health geography, and adapted a gravity model to do so. They determined that given a 
maximum range per service offered and assuming that each individual in the study population is a 
potential user of the service, the spatial pattern of physical accessibility to the service will be dependent 
upon the relative location of the population and the service. Using access to general practitioners as a 
case-study with which to model potential access to services, they proposed the following gravity model: 
 




Ai is potential physical access of the population of area i to general practitioners 
GPj is the general practitioner at point j within the range of area i 
dij is the distance between I and j 
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𝑅𝑅 
b is a function of distance 
(Joseph & Bantock, 1982) 
 
To capture the effect that population demand, a function of population size, may have on the 
availability of services, Joseph and Bantock (1982) proposed a subsequent model for estimating 
differential availability of services, represented as differential availability of physicians: 
 




Where the demand on a physician (Dj) at point j is a function of the population size within the 
service area of point j (or within the maximum range per service offered) modified by the distance from 
the population to point j. Joseph and Bantock (1982) then combine these equations to create an adapted 
gravity model that captures the effect that differential availability of service will have on potential 
access to healthcare (𝐴𝐴∗). In the case study, services are again represented by access to general 
practitioners (GP). 
 






Because this model focuses on the relationship between the physical distance separating the 
population and the service while also considering the effect of the demand the population exerts on the 
service, only data on population distribution and service location is needed (Joseph & Bantock, 1982). 
It is a simple, yet useful measure of the potential geographic accessibility of populations to healthcare 
services. 
Floating catchment area (FCA) metrics are based on gravity models, and incorporate service 
supply, potential population demand and differential availability, and physical distance into their 
estimation of spatial accessibility to healthcare services (Delamater, 2013). There are many versions 
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of floating catchment area models, with several of the metrics improving upon the previous one. 
Though FCA metrics are gravity-based models, a notable difference between FCA metrics and 
gravity models is that FCA metrics attempt to merge measurements of spatial accessibility and 
differential availability into a single measurement representative of the overall accessibility of 
services by the population (Delamater, 2013; Guagliardo, 2004)This measurement of accessibility is 
assigned to the geographic area as X amount of service (i.e. physicians, hospital beds, etc.) per Y 
amount of the population, demonstrating the services available to the population considering the 
physical accessibility of the population to each service and the magnitude of available services within 
the catchment area. 
The Huff Model (Huff, 1963, 1964) is designed to capture the probability (P) that an individual 
(i) will utilize a facility (j) when presented with the option of multiple facilities, given that the utility 
of j is relative to the sum of the utility of all other facilities (n) considered by the individual (i) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 = 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃/∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗=1   
In this model, choice behavior is viewed as probabilistic and is dependent upon the perceived utility 
of the facility. The perceived utility is any variable or parameter upon which the individual is assumed 
by the model to give preference to one facility over another. To adapt this model to capture the 
probability of choosing healthcare facilities, utility (U) is changed to capacity (C), which may be 
represented by the service being studied (i.e. physicians, hospitals beds, etc.) (J. Luo, 2014). By doing 
this, the utility of the facility to the individual, the factor by which they are assumed to make their 
decision, is actually the capacity of the facility to provide care. Additionally, distance (dij) and a distance 
impedance coefficient (- β) is incorporated into the model to consider the effects that travel time may 
have on an individual’s choice behavior (Luo, 2014). The Huff Model for quantifying probability of 










STATE OF LITERATURE ON MODELING VULNERBILITY TO PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
There are no previous reviews on methodologies for assessing vulnerability to pandemic influenza. 
There are reviews focusing on the use of influenza modeling to understand epidemiological dynamics and 
evaluate response strategies which touch on the importance of population profiles (Dorjee et al., 2013), 
but none that specifically investigate the existing literature on methodologies for assessing vulnerability 
to pandemic influenza.   
The PRISMA methodology (Moher et al., 2009) was adapted to conduct a scoping review for this 
study. A scoping review is more appropriate for this research than a systematic review, as modeling 
vulnerability to pandemic influenza is an emerging area of research. Thus, the intention of this review is 
to detail the state of literature on vulnerability to pandemic influenza, rather than to systematically answer 
a well-defined research question or offer detailed critiques of methodologies. 
Studies included are those that described methods for understanding some component of vulnerability 
(demographic characteristics, location, socio-economic status, etc.). Though “vulnerability” is a 
“contentious and fluid term” (Smith et al., 2010), it is also a broad descriptor for a number of 
characteristics that may cause an individual or population to fare more poorly than their counterparts in 
certain crisis situations. Such characteristics of vulnerability include: economic disadvantage, social 
exclusion and stigma, minority status, education level, age, sex and gender, immune status, geographic 
location, and more. Such characteristics can be grouped into types or “layers” of vulnerability 
(Mastroianni, 2009) such as social vulnerability, economic vulnerability, physical vulnerability, etc. For 
this review, “vulnerability” is used in the broadest sense to include any characteristic and any layer or 
type of vulnerability. Inclusion criteria for this review are the following: the study was peer-reviewed and 
the study focused on one or more types of influenza across one or more geographic scales. All publication 
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years from 1918-onwards were included.  Exclusion criteria included: a focus on vulnerability in an 
immunological context (i.e. cellular vulnerability), employment of the term “vulnerability” when referring 
to vaccines or vaccine behavior, a focus on influenza in non-human populations, a focus on vulnerability 
of infrastructure, a focus on perceptions of vulnerability, a focus on risk instead of vulnerability (and 
subsequently a misuse of the word “vulnerability”), and a focus on the epidemiological characteristics of 
shared risk factors rather than population-level characteristics that predicate vulnerability.  
The following article databases were consulted: PubMed, Web of Science, Google Scholar, the UNC 
Chapel Hill Libraries collections, the Homeland Security Digital Library, and Scopus for publications 
originally written in, or translated to, English or French since January 1, 1918 using the following set of 
keywords: “influenza”, “pandemic”, “flu-like”, “flu-related”, “*flu”. “flu*”, AND “vulnerability”. 
Searches were conducted so that publications that used any of the above keywords in the title, abstract, or 
body of the text would be included in the results. The abstracts of returned publications were analyzed to 
identify candidates for full-text review. Shared-citation reviews were also conducted for studies that met 
the full inclusion criteria. The literature search was conducted from November 21, 2019 through 
December 5, 2019 and determined which publications to include based on the abstract. For included 
publications, a full text review was completed and the following variables were recorded: vulnerability 
characteristic being investigated, the timeframe, data source, type and scale of influenza being 
investigated, geographic location, analytical methods, and findings.  
The number of results from each database can be found in Table 1. It is worth noting that despite 
decades of archived MMWRs from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), congressional 
proceedings and special committee reports, and pandemic influenza preparedness plans the search in the 
Homeland Security Digital Library yielded 0 results. When the keyword “vulnerability” was removed 
from the search and only “influenza” was used as a keyword, there were 9,043 results. In total, from all 
searches there were 59,130 results. Searching the body of the text, abstract, and keywords on Google 
Scholar provided the greatest number of search results, however, by the twelfth page of search results the 
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results were no longer relevant to this review. Additionally, all studies identified for inclusion in the 
Google Scholar were also identified in the searches on Scopus, PubMed, and Web of Science. Out of all 
59,130 search results, 114 contained both keywords “influenza” and “vulnerability” and were topically 
relevant, and thus selected for abstract analysis. Of these, thirteen were selected for full text review.  
 
Table 1 - Number of results from each database. 
Nine out the thirteen articles were included in this scoping review after a full-text analysis. Eight of 
the studies were published after 2009, with a majority being published in 2012 or later. Four focused 
specifically on the 2009 H1N1 Swine Influenza Pandemic, one focused on the 1918 Spanish Influenza 
Pandemic, three focused generally on pandemic influenza, one focused on seasonal influenza. Two 
studies provided a methodology for modeling vulnerability. One presented a method for assessing 
population-level vulnerability to pandemic influenza; the other provided a method for assessing individual 
vulnerability to influenza.  The focus of this research is modeling to assess population-level vulnerability 
to pandemic influenza. The studies fell into three categories based on employment of “vulnerability” in 
the study: individual vulnerability (primarily age, sex, socio-economic status, and immunological status), 
minority populations (primarily immigrant), and pandemic planning and preparedness. The study areas 
spanned the globe and varied in geographic scale. On a national scale, Australia, the United States, and 
Canada were study sites. Locally, studies were conducted in New York City, U.S., Madrid, Spain, and 
Linköping, Sweden.  
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Among the studies focused on individual vulnerability, age was the most studied vulnerability 
characteristic (n = 4), followed by health behavior (n = 2), socio-economic status (n = 1), immunological 
status (n = 1), and sex ( n = 1), occupation (n = 1). One study, a modeling study, included age, 
occupation, health behavior, and socio-economic status. These studies employed a variety of methods, 
including health record aggregate analysis (Greer et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2019) interviews (Stephenson 
et al., 2014), case-control with matching (Levy et al., 2013), and actuarial analysis (Woo, 2019). The 
modeling study included in this category used a Monte Carlo method to create a statistical distribution of 
their study population and a social network design with random seeding of infection to simulate influenza 
transmission (Bian et al., 2012). These studies investigated both seasonal and pandemic influenza, both 
generally and the 2009 H1N1 Swine Influenza Pandemic. 
The study focused on minority populations’ vulnerability to pandemic influenza employed a 
descriptive cross-sectional study using data from the Madrid Public Health System to describe the 
incidence and characteristics of influenza patients from both immigrant and native Spanish populations in 
Madrid during the 2009 H1N1 Swine Influenza Pandemic. This study also conducted a literature review 
of influenza incidence characteristics in immigrant and native populations in other countries, including 
Norway, the United Kingdom, the USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (Esteban-Vasallo et al., 
2012). There were two studies focused on pandemic planning; of these, one was a modeling study. The 
first study in this category (Blumenshine et al., 2008) used a conceptual framework developed by Evans 
(2001) to conduct a literature review for relevant findings on vulnerability in the context of health 
disparities research. They focused on three channels through which vulnerability can express itself during 
an influenza pandemic: 1. Likelihood of exposure, likelihood of disease contraction and symptomatic 
expression, and 3. Likelihood of receiving timely and effective treatment. They found that socially 
disadvantaged groups in the U.S.  are likely to be disproportionately affected by pandemic influenza 
through each of the channels; this is consistent with existing knowledge of vulnerability and health. The 
modeling study in this category (Timpka et al., 2010) employed a spatially explicit geo-physical model of 
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their study site, Linköping municipality in Sweden and an ontology-modeling tool to simulate infection 
and transmission. This study included daycares, playgroups, and schools in addition to households, 
workplaces, and neighborhoods in their mixing groups, which is unique, though likely not possible on a 
scale larger than community-level. This study computed a Neighborhood Influenza Susceptibility Index 
(NISI) to describe vulnerability of local communities within the municipality, based on the geo-social-
physical structure of the site in order to attempt to bridge the gap between traditional epidemiological 
research and spatially explicit health research for pandemic influenza.  
This review presents the current state of literature on modeling vulnerability to pandemic influenza. 
Several methods for evaluating vulnerability to influenza were identified, including statistical analysis of 
shared characteristics among incident cases and hospital admissions, outbreak simulation, and participant 
interviews. Despite a variety of methods, the number of studies is very low. This highlights the dearth of 
research focusing on vulnerability to pandemic influenza. Many of the studies retrospectively investigated 
vulnerability to pandemic influenza using hospital admissions data from the 2009 H1N1 Swine Influenza 
Pandemic. Though retrospective research is incredibly valuable, it is also important to model vulnerability 
to pandemic influenza during “what-if” scenarios that represent potential future pandemics. These “what-
if” scenarios are vital for increasing our understanding of pandemic influenza, an unpredictable and 
deadly event, as well as our understanding of who will be affected and why. Only two studies identified in 
this review utilized a modeling approach to asses a “what-if” scenario, and only one focused on pandemic 
influenza rather than seasonal. This study (Timpka et al., 2010) affirms the need for continued research on 
sociodemographic vulnerability characteristics and differences in such characteristics between different 
places.  
It is worth noting that many of the studies first identified for potential inclusion describe pandemic 
influenza epidemiological risk and shared risk characteristics among influenza cases at varying scales and 
in diverse populations. As previously discussed, risk is different from vulnerability (Rothman, 2008; 
Westreich, 2019), and an understanding of both is crucial to our ability to prepare for the next pandemic. 
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Many of these epidemiological risk studies focus specifically on quantifying the disproportionate burden 
of risk to pandemic influenza carried by minority populations, including indigenous, native, and first 
nations peoples, and immigrant and refugee communities, however. This focus on traditionally vulnerable 
populations indicates that even though the studies are not explicitly focused on assessing vulnerability, 
there are trends to acknowledge and account for vulnerability and vulnerable populations in the pandemic 
planning literature.  
There is also a technical report to the Public Health Agency of Canada that, although not included in 
this review because it did not meet the inclusion criteria of peer-review, is worth mentioning (O’Sullivan, 
2010). This report pulls from the literature on social vulnerability and public health to discuss population 
characteristics associated with vulnerability identified in the literature, following the Whole-of-Society 
Approach to Pandemic Planning for the nonhealthy sector from the World Health Organization (WHO, 
n.d.).  
This review has some limitations. The possibility that relevant studies were not identified cannot be 
excluded; despite using broad search terms, searching multiple databases, and searching for studies in 
multiple languages. This search would not have yielded studies described only in conference proceedings, 
nor would it have captured unpublished studies. This study also focused exclusively on pandemic 
influenza; however, studies of vulnerability to infectious diseases overall, as well as other pandemic 
diseases such as SARS and Ebola, are also useful for developing and refining methodologies. 
Additionally, it should be acknowledged that papers focusing on shared risk characteristics, 
epidemiological profiles of patients, and those that acknowledge vulnerability as a factor contributing to 
certain outcomes are invaluable to the larger body of literature dedicated to understanding and preparing 
for pandemic influenza, despite being correctly excluded from this review based on my criteria. This 
review is a scoping review intended to detail the state of literature on assessing vulnerability to influenza, 
rather than systematically review and offer detailed critiques of assessment methodologies. A systemic 
review and critique of methodologies would be useful, but a broad review of the literature on modeling-
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based assessments of vulnerability, as presented here, provides a necessary foundation for such a review 
as well as other future studies in this area.  
The results of this review present several diverse methodologies for assessing vulnerability, both 
historically, to deepen our understanding of the impacts of vulnerability on the trajectory and experience 
of pandemic influenza as well as the impacts of pandemic influenza on vulnerable populations, and in a 
simulated potential future pandemic. Researchers conducting studies that simulate potential future 
pandemics should look to the assessments of vulnerability in past pandemics as foundations for accurate 
simulations of vulnerability in forward-looking studies. This review also presents the need for continued 
research in this area; despite broad search terms employed across multiple databases, less than ten studies 
were identified for inclusion in this review. The studies analyzed for inclusion in this review spanned 
many different disciplines, including epidemiology, medicine, geography, economics, actuarial statistics, 
health communications, virology, psychology, anthropology, immunology, and law. It is imperative that 
researchers collaborate across disciplines to continue to refine methodologies for assessing vulnerability 
to pandemic influenza. Pandemic influenza has been identified by multiple agencies at all level of 
governance as a prioritized threat to global public health. Accurate and thorough understandings of 




Despite extensive and on-going research on pandemic influenza preparedness planning, there is a 
surprising dearth of literature regarding who is most at risk to dying from influenza, where this risk is 
concentrated, and why. This project aims to contribute to this gap in the literature by investigating how 
vulnerability to influenza is unevenly spatially dispersed throughout the population. Currently, the risk of 
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mortality from influenza has primarily been assigned to individuals via age categories, ignoring socio- 
demographic and geographic factors that may increase or lower fatality risk. 
This project will identify socio-demographic and spatial factors contributing to an increased risk of 
mortality in block groups highlighted as being hot spots of increased risk. Thus far, a predominance of the 
research on pandemic influenza has been concentrated within disciplines of public health. This project 
considers vulnerability to pandemic influenza with a geographic perspective and will result in a new 
methodology for assessing vulnerability to infectious disease that integrates epidemiological modeling 
with spatio-statistical modeling, incorporating geographic theory with established public health practice. 
It will aid in the understanding of population vulnerability to a novel influenza virus and amplify the 
ability to respond to unpredicted health crises that affect large numbers of the population. 
There is almost total agreement in the literature that the most important factor in pandemic 
preparedness is the creation and stockpiling of a universal vaccine. The National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza, its associated Implementation Plan, and the Dept. of Health and Human Services Pandemic 
Influenza Plan all focus heavily on the need for rapid vaccine production, citing the 2009 swine flu 
pandemic in which a vaccine was not widely available until after the peak of new infections (U.S. 
Homeland Security Council, n.d.).  
The Pandemic Influenza Plan for North Carolina is incredibly comprehensive, and includes basic 
calculations of expected number of cases, plans for stockpile and allocation of antivirals in addition to 
vaccinations, worksheets for assessing surge capacity, and containment plans (Influenza (Flu) | North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). However, the distribution and allocation 
protocols included in the plan do not have geographic specificity and do not identify places deemed to be 
at higher risk or more vulnerable. The Pandemic Influenza Plan for Alabama is comparably detailed, with 
similar plans for development and distribution of vaccines and antivirals, protocols for locating 
appropriate facilities for response, and guidance for addressing the public in a variety of settings, 
including in-clinic for crowd management (Pandemic Influenza | Alabama Department of Public Health 
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(ADPH), n.d.). This plan does not include any health care surge capacity assessment, nor does it discuss 
vulnerability or risk with any geographic specificity. Both plans identify potentially high-risk 
demographic groups, including the elderly, children, and pregnant women, but neither plan discusses the 
current spatial distribution of individuals within those groups.   
Though vaccines are an indisputably important component of pandemic preparedness and prevention, 
they are not efficacious without being deployed to populations most at risk. Additionally, it is short-
sighted to build the entirety of a pandemic preparedness plan around the potential for vaccine 
development, as there is no guarantee that a vaccine can actually be developed, and the process of vaccine 
development is long. This near-complete reliance on a vaccine is a strategic gap that this study aims to 
contribute to; it assumes that no vaccine will be developed. This is because one of the primary conditions 
for pandemic disease is that it cannot be vaccinated against at the start. Thus, this study models a type of 
worst-case scenario of pandemic impacts to create an understanding of who will be affected and where, 
should the most disastrous possible pandemic occur with no vaccine development. The incorporation of 
vulnerability modeling to this study can also contribute to the lack of actionable vaccine distribution plan 
by providing an answer to the question “where will people be disproportionately affected by pandemic 
influenza, given the demographic makeup of the affected population and level of access to healthcare 
services?” This study uses the actual spatial and demographic distribution of the population of the study 
area based on the last decennial census (2010) to model the spatial pattern of impacts as accurately as 
possible. This knowledge of where impacts could potentially be greatest can also contribute to the 
formation of an actionable plan should there be a limited number of vaccines by identifying populations 
that may not be able to receive healthcare should they become infected. One possible response to 
pandemic influenza given a limited number of vaccines could be to prioritize vaccination of healthcare 
workers and the populations who are the least likely to receive care in the hopes that they are able to resist 
infection and thus survive the inability to receive care, allocating remaining vaccines along the gradient of 
access from lower to higher. This strategy would likely result in rings of vaccinated populations around 
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urban areas because of the associations between rurality and lowered access to healthcare. These rings of 
vaccinated populations may ultimately slow the transmission of the virus when combined with other 
public health measures such as limiting nonessential travel and infection-screening points in a fashion 
reminiscent of the ring-vaccination strategy used to eradicate smallpox.  
 
BROADER IMPACTS 
The broader impacts of the study are that (1) it has the potential to refine existing methodologies by 
integrating vulnerability frameworks, creating new methodologies that other scientists can use, (2) it has 
the potential to improve national health security, and (3) it has the potential to benefit and improve well-
being of individuals in society by broadening our understanding of influenza vulnerability in ways that 
will strengthen public health preparedness and readiness, potentially decreasing flu mortality during 
future outbreaks. This project will result in information that can be used by the aforementioned 
governing bodies as their pandemic preparedness plans continue to evolve. The dissemination of this 
research will include conference presentations that will be attended by Public Health Preparedness and 
Response professionals. Pandemic Influenza has been listed as a top national health security threat by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and this research will help to address this concern. This 
research is a timely and necessary investigation into the spatiality of vulnerability to pandemic influenza 
and will result in clear and direct answers to the questions of “who is most at risk of dying from 
pandemic influenza?”, and “where are they?”. 
There is an urgent need for models such as this one. As this manuscript was being prepared, the WHO 
declared the 2019-2020 novel coronavirus SARS-2 (pathogen) COVID-19 (illness) (WHO, 2020) 
outbreak to be pandemic. Already, there are reports of inadequate hospital capacity (Cavallo et al., 2020; 
KXAN, 2020.; The Guardian, 2020), which will undoubtedly lead to higher rates of serious complications 
and mortality. Though not an influenza virus, COVID-19 causes clinically similar symptoms and requires 
similar medical care. Thus, this research remains applicable to the situation at hand, and is consistent with 
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the current state of literature in which 1918 Spanish Flu remains the standard for pandemic and health 
care disaster research. Additionally, the need for research such as this is also demonstrated by the 2017-
2018 seasonal influenza epidemic in the United States. Though a seasonal epidemic, not a pandemic, 
hospitals across the United States exceeded their surge capacity and had implement alternative care sites 
for influenza patients. Many of them erected tents in the parking lots of their emergency departments 
specifically for the triage and treatment of flu patients. (Karlamangla, n.d.). This, and the beginnings of 
system overwhelm already evident during the burgeoning COVID-19 pandemic, are demonstrative of the 
observed inability of the existing system to provide care for an increased number of patients. There is a 


















This research investigates vulnerability to mortality from pandemic influenza by creating a pandemic 
scenario model that will simulate a pandemic and subsequent attempts by the population to access health 
care throughout the course of the simulated pandemic, deploying the clinical case and case fatality rates 
from the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic to seed infections in the population. There are three objectives for 
this study: (1) Determine where individuals are most vulnerable to dying from influenza, (2) Investigate 
how vulnerability to pandemic flu mortality in the U.S. is related to the spatial variation of population 
characteristics and access to health care, and (3) Determine if the modeled fatality distribution is similar 
to actual pandemic flu mortality distributions. Below is a summary of a pilot project that served as the 
validation and basis for this thesis. Two different independent study areas were chosen as case-studies for 
this research; Alabama and North Carolina. 
 
PILOT PROJECT: SPATIO-TEMPORAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL MODEL 
A pilot of the proposed spatio-temporal epidemiological model and capacitated shortest-distance 
allocation model was conducted using the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(The Triangle region) of North Carolina as a case-study (Woodul et al., 2019). This pilot confirmed the 
validity of the modeling approach and highlighted the need for an expanded study. This seven-county 
region was chosen as the pilot site because of its unique population profile that closely matched the 
mortality profile of the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic. This thesis expands upon this pilot work to include 
a more diverse population and broader geographic scale.  
An extensive description of the methods that are used in both the pilot and in this study can be found 
on page 25 as well as in Woodul at al., 2019. Below you will find the results of the pilot project. Using 
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site-specific infectivity parameters, the spatio-temporal epidemiological model developed for this 
research was able to simulate an influenza pandemic in the population that resulted in a total count of 
infections that differed from the calculated expected total count of infections by less than 150 infections. 
This validates the spatially-adjusted SIR model as an effective method for simulating a pandemic in the 
population while maintaining spatial specificity. When the space was incorporated into the model, the 
















Figure 4 – Pilot Project Combined SIR Model Results. The blue line is susceptible population, the red line is the infected 
population, and the green line is the removed population. 
 
The capacitated shortest-distance allocation was successful in simulating infected individuals 
accessing and utilizing health care resources. The capacity for the facilities in this modeled scenario was 
75% of licensed hospital beds. Potential capacity was capped at 75% of beds to reflect the prevailing 
occupancy of facilities by long- term care patients. It does not take into account the standard day to day 
operating occupancy of the hospital by scheduled procedure patients, walk-in emergency patients with 
non-influenza related needs, labor and delivery patients, standard pediatric care patients, and other non-
influenza patients. Thus, this capacity scenario was the most optimal in terms of available care 
resources, though likely overoptimistic. 
The pilot study resulted in the distribution of individuals unable to access care being quite radial 
around each closest facility, which is the expected result considering the service areas of each facility 
and the effect of distance decay. The capacity scenario utilized in this model resulted in roughly 67% of 
the infected population receiving care, and about 33% of the infected group making up the “non-
hospitalized” group. This resulting lack of ability to provide care, event in the most optimal realistic 
capacity scenario, signifies the vulnerability to fatality from influenza caused by a demonstrated lack of 
access to health care services in the population without consideration of the socio-economic or 
demographic characteristics of the population. 
36 
 






Figure 6 - Distribution of individuals infected with influenza unable to receive care, 
from the pilot project. 
 
STUDY SITES 
This proposed study employs two different, independent, sites as case studies for assessing the 
efficacy of the model and investigating the relationship between the study variables and vulnerability to 
mortality from pandemic flu. The two sites differ in population density, demographic structure, and 
levels of access to health care. The differences are deliberate, in an effort to create a more holistic 
assessment of vulnerability to mortality.  
The first case study site is North Carolina. North Carolina was chosen because it encompasses the 
seven counties originally chosen as the site for the pilot study supporting this research. North Carolina 
has a unique mix of urban and rural populations; it has several large metropolitan areas but also has the 
second largest rural population in the U.S. It is also home to three major research hospitals, four 
teaching hospitals, twenty-three major hospital networks, twenty-six total hospital networks, and 126 
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total hospitals in 83 of the 100 counties, making it among the top ten states as far as number of 
hospitals. All three major research hospitals and at least one hospital in nine of the hospital systems is 
equipped to treat serious infectious diseases, including pandemic influenza. It is also home to the 
Research Triangle Park in the central part of the state, which boasts the highest concentration of PhD 
holders in the world, most of whom are young adults. There are 16 universities in the University of 
North Carolina system, 60 private colleges and universities, and an extensive network of community 
colleges, bolstering the population of young people and creating pockets of denser population across the 
state. Additionally, North Carolina also has several military bases that create pockets of higher 
population density and an increased density of young adults. In terms of infection transmission and 
relative risk per age-group, North Carolina is a type of worst-case scenario location for baseline risk of 
contracting influenza because of the high-density pockets of young adults. However, these high-density 
areas are surrounded by rural areas of less dense population. This, combined with the extensive network 
of integrated health care systems across the state, may also render it a type of best-case scenario in terms 
of potential to access care, potentially mitigating the influence of certain socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics on vulnerability. 
Alabama was chosen as the second case-study site. Based on the mandatory reporting to the CDC of 
ILI for the past twenty seasonal epidemics available on the FluView Dashboard (CDC, n.d.), Alabama 
has consistently been among the first states to reach the highest category of ILI in the country. The 
health care access profile of Alabama is also very different from that of North Carolina. Of the 67 
counties in the state, only 28 have achieved an optimal level of access to health care (Alabama 
Department of Public Health (ADPH, n.d.). Per the Alabama Department of Public Health, citizens have 
identified access to care as the greatest health concern for the state. Despite a low level of relative access 
to health care, Alabama has 92 hospitals in 59 counties (American Hospital Directory, n.d.) with four 
being research and teaching hospitals. This is 34 less hospitals than exist in North Carolina, however, it 
is not particularly exceptional relative to other states. However, of the 92 hospitals, only three are 
participant hospitals in the newly launched Serious Infectious Disease network, which equips the 
39 
hospitals with one special isolation room with negative airflow and specific protective equipment for 
staff. This network was implemented in order to respond to an observed lack of ability to respond to 
serious infectious diseases. The protocol for a positive diagnosis of a highly infectious disease requires 
the patient be transferred to a regional treatment center, the closest of which is Emory Medical Center in 
Atlanta, GA. This differs from North Carolina, in which all three research hospitals and at least one 
hospital in nine of the hospital systems is equipped to treat serious infectious diseases. Certain types of 
influenza are included in the Serious Infectious Diseases for which this network is intended (AuBuchon, 
n.d.). Alabama is also markedly different demographically from North Carolina. It has a much smaller 
population, trailing North Carolina by almost 5.5 million people, and a much larger proportion of its 




The spatio-temporal epidemiological model developed for this study relies on census data at the 
block group level, road networks, hospital capacity data, and clinical case and case fatality rates from the 
1918 Spanish Flu pandemic. Data from the 2010 Decennial Census providing the reference population 
data by age group with associated socioeconomic and demographic indicators was downloaded from the 
IPUMS National Historical Geographic Information System database (https://www.nhgis.org/), 
maintained by the Institute for Social Research and Data Innovation at the University of Minnesota 
(Manson, 2019). The road networks for each study area are maintained by each state’s Department of 
Transportation and hosted by ESRI on their ArcGIS online server. Hospital capacity data comes from 
each state’s Department of Health and Human Services (https://www.ncdhhs.gov/; 
https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/) and is publicly available. The clinical case and case fatality rates 
for the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic come from the primary data collected by Dr. W. H. Frost in 1918 and 
from recent pandemic influenza studies by Dr. John Brundage MD, MPH at the U.S. Army Center for 
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Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (now the U.S. Army Public Health Center). Mortality rates 
were calculated using data from recent pandemic influenza studies by Brundage (2006), Taubenberger 
and Morens (2006), and Lemaitre and Carrat (2010). Hazard multiplier data associated with lack of health 
care comes from a study by Franks et. al (1993). Death records data are maintained by each state’s 
Department of Vital Records (https://vitalrecords.nc.gov/; 
http://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/vitalrecords/) and are publicly available. 
 
DATA PREPROCESSING 
Population-weighted centroids for each census block group were calculated and located on the road 
network. Hospital locations were also located on the network. Using this network, a shortest driving 
distance analysis was conducted for each census block group population-weighted centroid to each 
hospital in the study area. This produced an origin-destination (OD) table with the block groups as the 
origins, the hospitals as the destinations, and the driving distance between each.  
Age group-specific clinical case rates from the 1918 Spanish Influenza were estimated using a graph 
published by the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (Brundage, 2006) and 
the original 1919 mortality and case surveillance tables published by the U.S. Public Health Service 
(Frost, 1919, 1920; Frost & Sydenstricker, 1919). The age groups and clinical case rates are presented in 
Table 2. 
To calculate the total number of expected flu cases in the Triangle region based on an outbreak 
similar to 1918, age group-specific clinical case rates were multiplied by the corresponding age group 
population counts for census block group. This resulted in a count of total expected influenza cases per 
age group per census block group. The age group counts were summed for each block group and then 
summed over all block groups to create a count of total infected people for the study region by age group 
(Table 2). The age group counts for the study area were then summed to calculate the total number of 
infected people for the entire study area. Relative proportion of infected people by age group was also 
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calculated for each study area by dividing the age group count by the study area count.  
 
 










Objective 1: Determine where individuals are most vulnerable to dying from influenza. 
To achieve objective one, the pandemic and subsequent attempts by the population to use the available 
health care resources were modeled. 
SUSCEPTIBLE-INFECTIOUS-RECOVERED MODEL 
A Susceptible-Infectious-Removed (SIR) Model without vital dynamics (Woodul et al., 2019) was 
used to generate the site-specific infectivity parameters necessary for the virus to reach in each study 
area to generate a pandemic of 1918 Spanish Flu proportion. An SIR model uses a series of ordinary 
differential equations (ODE) to simulate a disease transmitting through a population based on the 
number of individuals in the population at any given time who are susceptible to the disease, infected 
with the disease, and then “removed” from the transmission pool either through recovery or death. The 
ODEs are calculated for each unit of time in the total pandemic time. For this research, the unit of time 
is one day and the total pandemic time is 730 days; the estimated length of time of the 1918 pandemic 
(Barry, 2004). For this research, a type of reverse-engineered SIR model was employed. However, it is 
not a new iteration of an SIR model and thus is still referred to as an SIR model. This was achieved by 
calculating the expected total number of infected individuals by applying age-group specific clinical 
case rates (CCR) to the population of each block group, then summing across the study area. Then, the 
infectivity parameters necessary to reach a pandemic that mirrors the 1918 pandemic in this study area 
were calculated. This results in site-specific infectivity parameters. A standard SIR model is then run 
using these infectivity parameters. The ODEs rely on the following infectivity parameters: 
 
(1) S, the number of susceptible individuals at any point in time. The initial S parameter is the 
total population excluding the index infections. In this model, the initial S is input as a 
proportion of the population. 
(2) I, the number of infected individuals at any point in time. The initial I parameter is the number 
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of index infections to be seeded in the population. In this model, the initial I is input as a 
proportion of the population. 
(3) R, the number of removed individuals at any point in time. The initial R parameter is 0. 
(4) 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓, the proportion of the population that has become infected at the end of the pandemic. 
 





(5) R0, the average number of people that one infected individual will infect.  
 





(6) 𝛾𝛾, the rate of recovery; how long it takes an infected individual to recover and thus the length 
of time in which they are able to infect other susceptible individuals. 





(7) 𝛽𝛽, contact rate; the rate at which susceptible individuals will become infected. 
 
𝛽𝛽 = 𝑅𝑅0 ∗ 𝛾𝛾 
 
The ODEs are: 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 = −𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑑𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝐼 
𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼 = (𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑑𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝐼) − ( 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐼) 
𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 = 𝛾𝛾 ∗ 𝐼𝐼 
 
 
The following initial parameters were used to seed influenza infections in the simulated population of 
North Carolina: 
Total (Beginning Susceptible) Population: 9,271,178 individuals  
Final Infected Population: 2,289,370 individuals 
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(1) Initial S = 0.99999 
(2) Initial I = .00001 (This is randomly infects .001% of the population, about 92 individuals) 
(3) Initial R = 0 
 
This resulted in the following infectivity parameters necessary to cause an influenza pandemic in the 
population of the study area: 
(4) 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓 = 0.246934 (This is an overall CCR of ~24.6%) 
(5) 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.148494 
(6) 𝛾𝛾 = 0.142857 
(7) 𝛽𝛽 = 0.164071 
 
The following initial parameters were used to seed influenza infections in the simulated population of 
Alabama: 
Total (Beginning Susceptible) Population: 4,712,651 individuals  
Final Infected Population: 1,169,336 individuals 
(1) Initial S = 0.99999 
(2) Initial I = .00001 (This is randomly infects .001% of the population, about 47 individuals) 
(3) Initial R = 0 
 
This resulted in the following infectivity parameters necessary to cause an influenza pandemic in the 
population of the study area: 
(4) 𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓 = 0.248127 (This is an overall CCR of ~24.8%) 
(5) 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.149362 
(6) 𝛾𝛾 = 0.142857 
(7) 𝛽𝛽 = 0.164194 
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This results in a temporal influenza transmission simulation, by outputting the number of 
susceptible, infected, and removed individuals at any given day in the pandemic. When this output is 
plotted, an epidemic curve is created, illustrating the speed at which the infection spreads through the 
population, the peak transmission time when the most people are becoming infected, and how long it 




Figure 7 - SIR Model for North Carolina (left) and Alabama (right) 
 
 
The SIR Model also generates an output of new infections per day for each day in the pandemic 
simulation. New infections per day are then allocated proportionally to age-groups based on 




Figure 8 - Visualization of spatial distribution of new influenza infections per day based on population age-group stratification. 
 
New infections per age group per day are then distributed across the study area to block groups based 
on the proportion of the total population in each age group contained in each block group. For example, if 
the number of people aged 0-5 in block group 37013500107032 was 177 and the total number of people 
aged 0-5 in the study area was 112,873, block group 37013500107032 would contain 0.15% of all people 
in this age group. If the age group-specific daily count of infected people was 74 (Day 285), block group 
37013500107032 would have 74 * 0.15% = .11 infected people for this age group. This process was 
implemented for each block group and each age group to calculate the age group-specific counts of 
infected people per block group per day, which were then summed to calculate the total count of infected 
people per block group per day. For this research, the SIR model and spatial distribution model are 
combined to create one spatio-temporal epidemiological model that simulates a disease transmitting 
through a population based on the population’s spatial distribution as time progresses. 
A capacitated shortest-distance allocation model (Woodul et al., 2019) was then employed to model 
the attempts of individuals to access and utilize healthcare. A capacitated shortest-distance allocation 
model considers facility capacity, the distance to all facilities, and the physical location of the study 
population to simulate access and use of health care services. The capacitated shortest-distance allocation 
model for this research draws on the theoretical bases of container metrics, gravity models, and floating 
catchment areas to inform its own method of considering access, and the method of modeling utilization 
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of facilities by infected individuals originates in the theoretical bases of Huff Models. 
 
CAPACITATED SHORTEST-DISTANCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
The capacitated shortest-distance allocation model presented in this study adapts accessibility metrics 
to simulate population access in order to measure utilization (Woodul et al., 2019). Joseph and Bantock’s 
(1982) adapted gravity model serves as the basis for the component of capacity in the model acting as a 
limiting feature of facilities. Though capacity is typically considered an attracting factor (Joseph & 
Bantock, 1982; J. Luo, 2014), it will be considered the limiting factor in the ability of individuals to 
utilize health care. By doing so, the model will not measure the ability of the population to access a 
facility as a floating catchment area metric would, but their ability to realize access through facility 
utilization. This model allows for the capacity to be set by the researcher. Official counts of licensed beds 
per facility are the baseline capacity and are adjusted to reflect the average operational occupation of the 
facility by long-term care patients, resulting in a capacity that is more reflective of the actual operating 
capacity of each facility on a given day. 
The effect of service supply on access is modeled in a similar fashion to floating catchment area 
metrics. However, instead of assigning a measurement of access to specific population points, as a 
floating catchment area would, this model considers the level of access at specific population points. 
Unlike a floating catchment area metric, this model outputs the ability of the population to utilize 
facilities, rather than potential access of the population. 
Although not a container-based metric, the model utilizes a type of container in simulating access to 
facilities. Specifically, the boundaries of the study area serve as the container, so to limit the population to 
accessing only facilities within the study area. The allocation method by which individuals are assigned to 
access their nearest facility, or the facility with the shortest distance from each individual’s assigned 
population point, comes from the Huff Model (Huff, 1963, 1964) of probabilistic selection behavior, in 
that the utility variable is distance of the facility from the individual. A closer facility has a higher 
perceived utility value and thus a higher probability of utilization. 
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Sick individuals are allocated to hospitals in the order they become infected using an iterative process 
for each unit of pandemic time (each day). Individuals are modeled as attempting to access their closest 
facility first, which is designated using an origin-destination matrix (OD matrix). The OD matrix is 
generated by running a network analysis on the roads network of the study area, point locations of 
hospitals, and point locations of population-weighted centroids of each block group.  
As the model runs, if the closest hospital is “full”, infected individuals are modeled as attempting to 
access the next closest hospital, with utilization occurring if they are still infected before and closer than 
the next infected individual attempting to access the facility. This repeats each day for each individual 
until they are either able to utilize a facility or move to the “non-hospitalized” group. All individuals are 
assumed to be able to physically access facilities, however, their ability to utilize the resources at a 
facility is based upon the available capacity of the facility and the number of people attempting to 
simultaneously access the services. If hospital capacity was exceeded, remaining individuals were 
considered to have been “turned away”, thus not receiving care. Individuals who successfully access and 
utilize hospital resources remain in the hospital for 3 days. This is the length of an average in-patient stay 
at a hospital in the U.S. (Davis et al., 2005). At the beginning of each successive day in the allocation 
model, for each hospital, the patients that had been hospitalized for three days were discharged (and 
removed from the hospital’s capacity), while the patients that had been hospitalized for two days were 
shifted to being hospitalized for a third day and the patients that had been hospitalized the previous day 
were shifted to being hospitalized for a second day. As such, each hospital’s remaining capacity was 
updated prior to the allocation process of each day’s newly infected people. “Discharged” patients that 
received 3 days of hospital care are then moved to the “removed” group, and are no longer infectious. 
Typically, the “removed” group indicates either recovery or death, however this will not be determined at 
this step in the process for this research. Mortality will be simulated in both the “removed” and 






This research relies on several assumptions. The first is that all infected individuals will seek health 
care services, and they will do so at a hospital. This assumption is supported by population health care 
seeking behaviors in recent seasonal influenza epidemics (Karlamangla, 2018; KTVZ, 2019). Next, it is 
assumed that there is no residual or pre-existing immunity in the population. This is a reasonable 
assumption, as this is one of the conditions required for a pandemic. Additionally, the potential for 
vaccination is not included in this model. In order for an influenza outbreak to become a pandemic, there 
must be no vaccine available to protect susceptible individuals. While there is the possibility that a 
vaccine could be developed during an actual pandemic due to modern medical advancements, that is not 
included in this model as there was no vaccination available during the 1918 pandemic or any of the 
subsequent pandemics.  
The model also does not account for socio-economic and demographic characteristics that may 
prohibit an individual from seeking health care, such as income, car ownership, access to transportation, 
citizenship, religion, and beliefs about health care. Rather, this research attempts to identify any common 
socio-economic and characteristics that may be shared between areas with the greatest vulnerability to 
fatalities from influenza. This model also does not incorporate insurance networks, as it is not possible to 
know the insurance status of the individuals represented by the simulated population. For the purposes of 
this model, physical space with which to provide care was represented by number of hospital beds, which 
is used as a proxy for space, resources, and providers.  
Because pandemic disease by its nature affects large numbers of the population in relatively similar 
ways, it can be assumed that affected members of the population within such a large geographic area will 
be attempting to access similar healthcare services. For the purpose of this study the infected population 
attempts only to access hospitals located within the boundaries of the study area.  The model also assumes 
that all infected members of the population are attempting to access healthcare facilities simultaneously 
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each day; though this is not an entirely realistic scenario, it allows for the highly nuanced influence of 
distance on hospital utilization to be captured. The model also assumes that individuals will attempt to 
access the facility closest to them with available space. This assumption is supported by the Huff Model 
of probabilistic selection behavior, which states that individuals will choose the facility they perceive to 
have the highest utility value when utility is defined by considering distance and size (Huff, 1963, 1964; 
J. Luo, 2014). In this model, size is represented by capacity, not physical size.  
Once an individual in this model has successfully utilized a facility, they will remain in the hospital, 
occupying a bed, for three days. Davis et al., (2005) assessed surge capacity and discharge rates for mass-
casualty events at multiple hospitals and found that, in a large portion of mass-casualty events, patients 
can be discharged within 24-72 hours after admission. In order to model the potential influence of length 
of stay on surge capacity for an influenza pandemic, the hospitalization period was modeled as 72 hours.   
This model also assumes that during a pandemic, there will be coordination at federal, state, and local 
levels to allow for different hospitals and health systems to work together to absorb the surge in demand 
for care generated across the system. Lastly, this research employs the assumptions that there will be 
funding for pandemic response, appropriate testing capacity, and sufficient medical supplies for each bed 
utilized for treatment.  
 
Using this model, the following analysis can be performed for each sub-question: 
Q1.1: What is the expected death rate for each block group, based on 1918 case fatality rates, with 
no modeled hospitalizations? 
Age-group specific mortality rates from the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic are applied to each age-group 
strata within each block group to generate a count of expected fatalities and associated fatality rate for 
each block group based on demographic composition, assuming no hospitalizations. 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 ∗  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 
=  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑋𝑋 +  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑌𝑌 +  … 
+  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑍𝑍 
=  𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 / 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 
=  𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 
 
Q1.2: What is the new expected mortality rate for a new influenza pandemic, given the modeled 
circumstances? 
The modeled post-hospitalization mortality rate is calculated in two steps. First, the final count of 
non-hospitalized individuals per block group is distributed by age-group based on the original age-





Figure 9 – Visualization of distribution of non-hospitalized individuals. 
 
A new non-hospitalized mortality rate is calculated by applying a risk multiplying hazard ratio 
of 1.25 (Franks et al., 1993) indicating the increase in risk of fatality without use of health care services 
compared to the original expected mortality rate. This rate will then be applied to the counts of non-
hospitalized individuals by age-group. 
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Figure 10 – Visualization of distributed multiplied risk of fatality. 
 
The resulting counts are then totaled to create a new count of deceased given the age-group 
structure of the population and level of access to healthcare. Counts with a decimal are rounded down. 
This new fatality count is then divided by the original count of total infected individuals to generate a 
new mortality rate for non-hospitalized individuals for each block group. A mortality rate for 
hospitalized individuals is calculated using the same proportional distribution by age group and division 
by total count of infected, without a risk magnifier, for each block group. The total overall modeled 
mortality rate for each block group is calculated by summing the count of deceased for both 
hospitalized and non- hospitalized individuals and dividing by the total count of infected. A total 
modeled mortality rate for each study area is calculated by summing all deceased and divided by count 
of total infected per study area. This is also the method for calculating a modeled total case fatality rate 






Figure 11 – Visualization of total counts of fatalities calculation. 
 
Q1.3: What is the distribution pattern? 
The modeled fatalities per block group are mapped. The spatial pattern of vulnerability to mortality 
due to the intermingling effects of population distribution and density, demographic structure, health care 
access, and geographic location will be investigated using spatial statistics and analysis. 
 
Q1.4: Is increased vulnerability concentrated anywhere? 
LISA for local clustering is applied to identify any hotspots, high-low clusters, and coldspots (areas of 
low rates surrounded by comparably low rates) of note. LISA, or Local Indicators of Spatial 
Autocorrelation uses a Univariate Local Moran’s I to assess the degree of autocorrelation between each 
observation and it’s first-order neighbors. Queen contiguity is used to determine first-order neighbors.  
 
Objective 2: Investigate how vulnerability to pandemic flu mortality in the U.S. is related to the 
spatial variation of population characteristics and access to health care. 
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This question uses the mapped model outputs from Objective 1. Vulnerability indicators measured on 
the 2018 American Community Survey are linked to the output data by block-group. Using the 2018 
American Community Survey provides the most recent assessment of these vulnerability indicators that 
can be matched with the population counts from the 2010 Decennial Census. The indicators are:  
(1) Ratio of Income to Poverty Level  
(2) Health Insurance Coverage 
(3) Educational Attainment 
(4) Receiving Some Level of Public Assistance Income 
 
Q2.1: What is the relationship between traditional socio-economic indicators of vulnerability and 
modeled mortality? 
The socioeconomic and demographic indicators from the 2010 Decennial Census are linked to the 
appropriate block group. Both linear (Pearson’s R) and non-parametric (Spearman’s ρ) tests were 
conducted to assess the relationship between measures of socio-economic vulnerability and mortality.  
 
Q2.2: How does socio-economic vulnerability to mortality from pandemic influenza correspond to 
spatial vulnerability? 
Results from prior process questions were mapped and described. 
 
Objective 3: Determine if the modeled fatality distribution is similar actual flu mortality 
distributions. 
This objective is a validation attempt to assess how well the model’s predicted vulnerability 
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matches actual vulnerability to mortality. Death certificates for the study areas for a selected influenza 
pandemic year are used for model validation. The following years have been selected: 2008-2010. The 
three-year cluster of 2008-2010 contains the 2009 A(H1N1)pdm09 Swine Flu pandemic. A three-year 
cluster has been selected to account for uncertainty in the official start date of the 2009 pandemic by 
including the calendar year before the official pandemic year and to span 730 days like the simulated 
pandemic. 2009, and not 1918, has been chosen due to availability of death records data in the study 
areas. This decision is still appropriate in this disease modeling scenario, as studies have found the 2009 
A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus to be a descendant strain of the 1918 influenza virus ((Medina et al., 
2010; Pérez-Trallero et al., 2009). 
 
Q3.1: Where are actual influenza deaths located? 
Death certificates with selected ICD-10 codes associated with the A(H1N1)pdm2009 pandemic 
were mapped on a zip code level for this analysis only. Death certificate data is not considered human 
subjects research and is not subject to IRB protections, however, to comply with HIPAA regulations and 
protect the privacy of families of the deceased actual address point locations were not mapped and the zip 
code and block group level maps was not made public. The only spatial scale on which this data could be 
mapped and shared was a state-level, and so no map was produced for publication. 
ICD-10 Codes: J090, J100, J101, J108, J11, J110, J111, J118, Z251, P002, J1000, J102, J1008, J1081, 
J1082, J1089, J1083, J09X2, J09X3, J09X9, J1100, J1120, J1010 , J1080, J1110, J1180, J0900, J1020 
 
Q3.2: How does the simulated pandemic compare to the last (2009) pandemic? 
Linear (r) and non-parametric (ρ) tests are conducted to assess how well the spatial distribution of actual 
deaths relates to the modeled deaths as a validation of the model. Modeled fatalities per block group are 
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transposed to the corresponding zip code for this analysis, the larger spatial container, as observed 







Objective 1: Determine where individuals are most vulnerable to dying from influenza. 
Q1.1: What is the expected case-mortality rate, based on 1918 case fatality rates, with no modeled 
hospitalizations? 
Based on the age-group specific case-mortality rates from the 1918 Pandemic, and without modeled 
hospitalizations, the expected case-mortality rate for block groups in North Carolina range from 1.0% to 
4.1%. This variation is due to the differences in age-structures of populations between block groups. The 
expected state-level mortality rate for North Carolina is 1.94%. With this rate, we would expect to see 
44,461 fatalities.   
Based on the age-group specific case-mortality rates from the 1918 Pandemic, and without modeled 
hospitalizations, the expected case-mortality rate for block groups in Alabama range from 0% to 3.3%. 
This variation is due to the differences in age-structures of populations between block groups. The 
expected state-level case mortality rate for Alabama is 1.93%. With this rate, we would expect to see 
22,614 fatalities.  
Q1.2: What is the new expected mortality rate for a new influenza pandemic, given the modeled 
circumstances? 
The modeled case-mortality rate for block groups in North Carolina ranges from 0.8%-14.8%. The 
overall state-level mortality rate is 2.31%; this is 37 percentage points higher than the expected mortality 
rate. This increase is driven by the mortality-hazard multiplier associated with a lack of medical care. This 
case-mortality rate corresponds to 52,954 fatalities.  
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The modeled case-mortality rate for block groups in Alabama ranges from 1.4%-3.6%. The overall 
state-level mortality rate is 2.22%; this is a 29 percentage points higher than the expected mortality rate. 
This increase is driven by the mortality-hazard multiplier associated with a lack of medical care. This 
case-mortality rate corresponds to 26,034 fatalities.  
Q1.3: What is the distribution pattern of case-mortality rates? 
There is no clear distribution pattern of overall case-mortality rates across the state of North Carolina 
(Figure 12). There appears to be a band of lower case-mortality rates connecting the three main urban 
areas: Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill (The Triangle), Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point (The 
Piedmont-Triad), and the Charlotte Metropolitan area. Higher case-mortality rates appear to be 
concentrated in the mountains and along the coast, though there is dispersal of all rate classes across the 
state.  There is also no clear pattern of case-mortality rates among the hospitalized and non-hospitalized 





















Figure 15 - Map of Count of Fatalities in North Carolina 
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There is no clear distribution pattern of case-mortality rate (Figure 16), mortality rate among 
hospitalized individuals (Figure 17), mortality rate among non-hospitalized individuals (Figure 18), or 




Figure 16 - Map of Overall Case-Mortality Rate in Alabama 
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Figure 17 - Map of CMR among Hospitalized Individuals in Alabama 
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Figure 18 - Map of CMR among Non-Hospitalized Individuals in Alabama 
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Figure 19 - Map of count of fatalities in Alabama 
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Q1.4: Is increased vulnerability to mortality concentrated anywhere? 
Yes. There are hotspots of high case-mortality rates dispersed through-out the state (Figure 20). 
Specifically, there are hotspots along the coast and parts of the Outer Banks, on the northern and southern 
state borders of the coastal plain region, and dispersed throughout the Piedmont. There are also several 
high-low clusters of note dispersed throughout the central Piedmont region of the state. Coldspots (areas 
of low rates surrounded by comparably low rates) are concentrated primarily around metropolitan areas in 
which the main facilities of the major hospital systems of the state are located, including Chapel Hill, 
Durham, Raleigh, Greensboro, Charlotte, Jacksonville, Lumberton, and Wilmington.  There are hotspots 
of high case-mortality rates among both the hospitalized (Figure 21) and non-hospitalized population 
(Figure 22) in the south-eastern most portion of the state, south of Wilmington along the South Carolina 
border, as well as dispersed with no clear pattern throughout the rest of the state. There are also high-low 














Figure 22 - Map of Clusters of CMR among Non-Hospitalized Individuals in North Carolina 
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In Alabama, there are hotspots of high case-mortality rate dispersed throughout the state, with no 
clear pattern, though it appears that they are mainly in the rural areas between metropolitan centers 
(Figure 23). Coldspots are located mainly in the center of the state, though there is no obvious dispersal 
pattern. There are small hotspots of high case-mortality rate among the hospitalized population dispersed 
across the state with no clear pattern (Figure 24). There are hotspots of high case-mortality rates among 
the non-hospitalized population spanning large swaths of the entire state (Figure 25).  
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Figure 23 - Map of Clusters of Overall CMR in Alabama 
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Figure 24 - Map of Clusters of CMR among Hospitalized Individuals 
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Figure 25 - Map of Clusters of CMR among Non-Hospitalized Individuals 
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Objective 2: Investigate how vulnerability to pandemic flu mortality in the U.S. is related to the 
spatial variation of population characteristics and access to health care. 
Q2.1: What is the relationship between traditional socioeconomic indicators of vulnerability and 
modeled mortality? 
There is a statistically significant slight positive correlation, both linearly (r) and non-parametrically 
(ρ), between all socio-economic vulnerability indicator variables and case-mortality rate for the block 
groups in North Carolina, excepting the indicator of “no education” in the non-parametric test (Table 3). 
There is a statistically significant slight positive correlation, both linearly (r) and non-parametrically 
(ρ) between most, but not all, of the socio-economic vulnerability indicator variables and case-mortality 
rate for the block groups in Alabama. Linearly, income-to-poverty-line ratio bins of 1.5-1.8 and 1.85-1.99 
and receiving some level of public assistance income were not significantly correlated. Non-
parametrically, the income-to-poverty-line ratio bin of 1.85-1.99, having no education, and having 
obtained a professional degree or doctorate degree were also not significantly associated. Receiving some 
level of public assistance income was the only variable to be negatively correlated, and was negatively 
non-parametrically correlated in Alabama block groups only (Table 3).  
Despite almost all variables being significantly associated with case-mortality rate, the correlations 
were incredibly slight. Only 4 variables had r or ρ values greater than .1 across both states: completely 
some college with no degree obtained, obtaining a bachelor’s degree, obtaining a master’s degree, and 





   
Table 3 - Results of linear and non-parametric tests of association between socio-economic vulnerability indicators and case-mortality rate for North Carolina and Alabama 
Ratio of Income to Poverty Level 
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Q2.2: How does socio-economic vulnerability to mortality from pandemic influenza correspond to 
spatial vulnerability to influenza?  
There was not a strong relationship between socio-economic vulnerability indicators and case-
mortality rate at a block group level in either state (Table 3), however, there is a clear pattern of spatial 
vulnerability to mortality (Figures 12-25).  
The distribution pattern of rates of non-hospitalized individuals in North Carolina appears to mirror 
the urban-rural pattern, with rates of infected individuals not receiving care appearing to increase radially 
around urban areas; however, high and low rates are interspersed throughout the state (Figure 26, 27, 28). 
There are hotspots of low rates of hospitalization spanning the entire state, very clearly in the rural areas 



















There are hotspots of high rates of hospitalization concentrated primarily around Chapel Hill, 
Durham, Raleigh, Greensboro, Charlotte, and Greensboro; these are metropolitan areas home to the 
primary hospital in almost all of the health care systems of the state. The cluster maps of hospitalized 





Figure 29 - Map of clusters of block groups where high proportions of the infected population were able to be hospitalized 
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There is a clear distribution pattern of rates of non-hospitalized individuals across the state of 
Alabama, indicating differences in spatial vulnerability as a function of access to health care services. The 
highest proportions of infected individuals being unable to receive care are in the block groups along the 
northern border of the state, the southern region surrounding Mobile Bay, and a wide band crossing the 
center of the state. The distribution of hotspots of low-hospitalization rates mirrors the count distribution 
(Figure 30, 31, 32).  
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Figure 30 - Map of count of non-hospitalized individuals in Alabama 
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Figure 31 - Map of percent of infected individuals unable to be hospitalized 
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Figure 32 - Map of clusters of block groups where high proportions of the infected population were unable to be hospitalized 
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Objective 3: Determine if the modeled fatality distribution is the same or different as actual flu 
mortality distributions. 
Q3.1: Where are actual influenza deaths located? 
The relative (zip-code level) locations of actual deaths from the 2009 Swine Flu pandemic have no 
clear distribution pattern across the state. In order to comply with HIPAA regulations and protect the 
privacy of the decedents and their families, the map cannot be published at any scale lower than a state 
level. At a state level, the count of fatalities from the 2009 Swine Flu pandemic in North Carolina is 107; 
for Alabama, the official state-level count is 36.  
Q3.2: How does the simulated pandemic compare to the last (2009) pandemic? 
There was a slight but statistically significant positive correlation, both linearly (r) and non-
parametrically (ρ), between the location of actual observed fatalities during the 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu 
Pandemic (H1N1pdm09) and the location of modeled fatalities in this research. Although not strongly 
correlated, the correlations were highly statistically significant (p≤.0001), indicating that we would not 
expect to see a relationship this strong under conditions of complete randomness (Table 4; Figure 28, 29).  
 
  
















Calculating the expected mortality rate from pandemic influenza in a modern population using only 
the age-group specific clinical case rates and case-mortality rates from 1918 (Frost, 1918) results in an 
overall case-mortality rate of 1.94%, a range of BG-level case-mortality rates spanning 1.0%-4.1%. Using 
these rates, if the Spanish Flu were to happen today in a modern population, with no differentiating 
effects of health care services, we would expect 44,461 fatalities.  
Modeling the expected mortality rate from pandemic influenza in a modern population, including the 
differentiating effects of health care, results in both a rate and count of fatalities higher than expected. 
Overall, the case-mortality rate for the state climbs 37 percentage points to 2.31%, and the range of BG-
level case-mortality rates expands to 0.8%-14.8%. This widened range and climb in overall case-mortality 
rate illustrates the effects of health care, both when it is received and when it is not. Lack of healthcare 
when it is needed is associated with a hazard ratio of 1.25 (Franks et al., 1993), meaning that hazardous 
impacts of health events are 25% more likely when the needed health care is not received. In this model, 
the case-mortality rate for each age-group was 25% higher in the non-hospitalized population than in the 
hospitalized population. This increase in case-mortality rate associated with lack of health care explains 
the increase in the overall mortality rate, and increase in local BG-level case-mortality rates on the upper 
end up to 14.8%, but it does not explain the drop on the lower end of this range to 0.8%. This drop is a 
function both population demographic distribution and access to health care. In BGs where most, if not 
all, of the population was able to successfully utilize health care, there was little to no effect of the 
increased hazard. Additionally, because both infection rates and case-mortality rates per block group were 
age-group specific, the demographic distribution could drive these rates down if the BG did not have 
large populations of individuals in the most high-risk age-groups. In this model, a pre-dominantly low-
risk population that is able to successfully utilize health care services will see a drop in case-mortality 
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rate. The change in case-mortality rates due to modeled use of health care services results in a mortality 
count totaling 52,954. This is 8,493 more deaths than would be expected using only the rates from 1918.  
ALABAMA 
Calculating the expected mortality rate from pandemic influenza in a modern population using only 
the age-group specific clinical case rates and case-mortality rates from 1918 (Frost, 1918) results in an 
overall case-mortality rate of 1.93%, a range of BG-level case-mortality rates spanning 0.0%-3.3%. These 
rates differ from those expected in North Carolina, highlighting the effect of population size and age-
group demographic distribution in influencing pandemic outcomes. Though the expected overall case-
mortality rate only differs by one percentage point and is consistent with 1918 data, the difference in 
range of expected BG-level case-mortality rates illustrates this importance. The population of Alabama is 
about half the size of North Carolina, and the population of Alabama is older, overall, than that of North 
Carolina. This drives the difference in local-level case-mortality rates, as risk of infection and mortality 
differ across age-groups; specifically, older adults are at a lower risk of both outcomes than younger 
adults (Frost, 1918). Using these rates, if the Spanish Flu were to happen today in a modern population, 
with no differentiating effects of health care services, we would expect 22,614 fatalities.  
Modeling the expected mortality rate from pandemic influenza in a modern population, including the 
differentiating effects of health care, results in both a rate and count of fatalities higher than expected. 
Overall, the case-mortality rate for the state climbs 29 percentage points to 2.22%, and the range of BG-
level case-mortality rates expands to 1.4%-3.6%. This widened range and climb in overall case-mortality 
rate illustrates the effects of health care, both when it is received and when it is not. Lack of healthcare 
when it is needed is associated with a hazard ratio of 1.25 (Franks et al., 1993), meaning that hazardous 
impacts of health events are 25% more likely when the needed health care is not received. In this model, 
the case-mortality rate for each age-group was 25% higher in the non-hospitalized population than in the 
hospitalized population. The effects of population size and demographic distribution are even more clear, 
as well as the influence of availability of health care resources. Though the population of the two states 
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are subject to the same simulated 1918-like pandemic, and both experience comparable percentage point 
increases in their overall case-mortality rate, the case-mortality rate of Alabama remains below that of 
North Carolina, and the range of local-level case-mortality rates is much smaller, with a much lower 
upper end. The upper end of the range of local-level CMRs increases only 3 percentage points, from 3.3% 
to 3.6%. Alabama has a higher bed-to-person ratio (0.003654) than North Carolina (0.002335), and the 
effect of this higher availability of resources is evident, as the impact of the increased hazard associated 
with lack of health care is not as great as it is in North Carolina. The change in case-mortality rates due to 
modeled use of health care services results in a mortality count totaling 26,034. This is 3,420 more deaths 
than would be expected using only the rates from 1918.  
The results of this modeling in Alabama seem promising; it appears that the health care system of 
Alabama is set up in such a way that large numbers of people were able to receive the necessary health 
care services. At 75% capacity, 91% of infected individuals were able to both access and utilize health 
care services. This is contrary to the actual state of health care in Alabama. In 2018, Alabamians 
identified access to health care as the greatest health concern in Alabama  (ADPH, n.d.). A demonstrated 
by this research, there are enough hospital beds in the state to be able to provide care for almost every 
individual who may need it in a large-scale event such as an influenza pandemic. This indicates that there 
are other barriers preventing Alabamians from accessing health care services. These include lack of 
insurance coverage, the geographic distribution of health care services, the cost of medical services, and 
lack of transportation, as well as systemic barriers created by legacies of racial segregation. As illustrated 
in Figures 30 and 31, there are areas of high and low access, each distinctly designated. Additionally, the 
large swath of little to no access to care, (Figure 31) corresponds neatly with what is referred to as the 
“black belt” of Alabama (Webster and Bowman, 2008), or the areas in which the largest proportions of 
black Alabamians reside. The literature documenting the systemic inequalities that persist in these areas 
as a result of racial discrimination and segregation is mountainous (Caldwell et al., 2016; Comber et al., 
2011; National Academies of Sciences et al., 2017; Richardson & Norris, 2010; Riley, 2012).  
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND CASE-MORTALITY RATE 
The association between all traditional socio-economic indicators of vulnerability and modeled 
mortality was positive (excepting receipt of public income assistance in Alabama, when analyzed non-
parametrically), albeit weak, both linearly (r) and non-parametrically (ρ). However, it was also extremely 
significant statistically. These results indicate that none of these socio-economic indicators stand out as 
increasing vulnerability to mortality from pandemic influenza. There was no protective level of education 
that was associated with lower mortality rates, and block groups with higher proportions of the population 
receiving public income assistance or lacking health insurance were not measurably associated with 
increased mortality. This does not mean that our traditional understandings of socio-economic 
vulnerability are incorrect, however. Rather, these results suggest that vulnerability to mortality from 
pandemic influenza in this model is shared across socio-economic strata, rather than just being 
concentrated in strata of low income or low educational attainment, for example. These findings suggest 
that there is no socio-economic class that is protective against mortality from pandemic influenza. This is 
extremely important to our understanding of vulnerability during pandemics, as it is evidence that more 
people could be vulnerable than initially believed. 
VALIDATION 
There were 107 confirmed deaths in North Carolina and 36 deaths in Alabama from H1N1pdm09, the 
flu virus responsible for the 2009 Swine Flu Pandemic. This was a relatively mild pandemic, with an 
overall clinical-case rate of .1% and a case-mortality rate of .02% (CDC, 2019; Crum-Cianflone et al., 
2009).  In both states, there was a slight but extremely statistically significant positive association, both 
linearly (r) and non-parametrically (ρ), between the location of actual 2009 fatalities and the location of 
modeled mortalities in this research. The weak correlation is likely to due the extreme differences in size 
between the two data sets being compared, in both states. However, this weak correlation was still 
extremely statistically significant (p ≤ .0001), indicating that we would not expect to see this strong a 
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relationship under conditions of complete randomness. This suggests that the model created in this 
research was able to identify the block groups where mortality would be expected.  
OVERALL  
This increase in overall case-mortality rate across both states is substantial. It suggests that should a 
pandemic comparable to the 1918 Spanish Flu happen today, when we consider the differentiating effects 
of health care, the impacts would be worse than what we currently expect. This is not a trivial finding – 
the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic is the deadliest event in modern human history, and the results of this 
research indicate that a comparable event happening today would be worse.  
It is extremely important to note that in this model, hospitals were modeled to be operating at 75% 
capacity for flu patients specifically. This reduction of available capacity from 100% was to account for 
non-influenza related occupancy of hospitals due to other in-patient needs. An allocation of 25% capacity 
to other in-patient needs, such as oncology, labor and delivery, and orthopedics (among many others) is 
consistent with literature findings that hospitals tend to operationalize only 25% of their bed capacity for 
long-term in-patient care during non-surge times. However, even a 75% capacity for flu patients during a 
pandemic is incredibly unrealistic. In a briefing on March 11, 2020 Dr. Ashish Jha, director of the 
Harvard Global Health Institute, said that around 70-75% of hospital beds in the U.S. are in use at any 
given time, due largely to the various out-patient procedures and services that hospitals perform. This 
leaves very few, if any beds, to be set aside for treatment of pandemic patients. Additionally, the first line 
of health care delivery for many pandemic influenza patients will be emergency departments (EDs). EDs 
are frequently at maximum capacity during non-surge times, and many EDs often set-up surge tents in 
parking lots during typical flu seasons to absorb the surge in demand for care created by flu patients. 
Thus, it is likely that the hospitalization rates of this model are an overestimation, when the realities of 
health care delivery in the United States are examined. This observed overwhelm of the health care 
system during seasonal flu does not bode well for pandemic flu.  
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Further, the systemic barriers to accessing health care, illustrated by the disparity between the 
modeled results and actual experience of health care delivery in Alabama, will likely result in even fewer 
individuals being able to receive the care that they need. Despite the partial implementation of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which was designed to ensure that all Americans had access to health 
insurance coverage, 27.9 million non-elderly (unqualified for Medicare) Americans remained uninsured 
(Tolbert et al., 2019). One possible explanation is the failure of all states to implement the ACA as it was 
designed. Many states, Alabama and North Carolina included, chose to limit the size of insurance 
marketplaces and refused to expand Medicaid. This decision has resulted in what is referred to as the 
“donut hole” of insurance coverage, in which low-income families do not receive health insurance 
through their employer and do not meet the extremely low threshold to qualify for Medicaid and other 
public assistance programs, but also do not have income levels high enough to afford to purchase private 
health insurance through their state marketplace, leaving them uninsured. In addition to health insurance, 
there remain numerous other social and economic barriers to health care that will undoubtedly get worse 
during a pandemic; for example, social stigma, racial profiling and refusal of services based on perceived 
race, loss of income, and closure of public transportation services, among others.   
This begs the question: how realistic is this modeled scenario? This research was conducted using the 
actual clinical-case rates from the 1918 Spanish Flu. These are real case rates from a real event that really 
happened, and it is among the deadliest events in human history. In 1918, the global population was 
smaller; there were only 1.8 billion people. Today, there are 8 billion. In North Carolina, there were about 
2.5 million people. Today there are more than 9 million. In Alabama, there were 2.3 million people. 
Today, there are about 4.8 million (Bureau, n.d.). The population has grown considerably in the last 
hundred years, and the level of global connection has also increased exponentially. During the 1918 
pandemic, the rapid global spread was blamed largely on the movement of young, susceptible troops 
during WWI (Barry, 2004; Kolata, 2001). Today, that level of global travel is far surpassed every day. It 
is possible to be anywhere in the world in 24 hours, and the same goes for pathogens. There is no 
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question that there will be another influenza pandemic. In fact, as this paragraph was written, the World 
Health Organization declared the newly emerged COVID-19 viral outbreak a pandemic. It is the 
hospitalization modeling that one could argue to be unrealistic, in that these results are incredibly 
optimistic given the current state of the American health care system. The results of this research are 
reflective of what we hope to see during a health crisis event of this magnitude, and they use parameters 
consistent with the current literature. The results of this model require that the system be able to absorb 
the surge created by a pandemic and that there is a coordinated and effective federal-level response to 
facilitate this kind of system-wide response. As demonstrated in earlier pandemics, as well as the current 
one, this level of federal response is difficult to predict. For example, during the beginning stages of the 
1918 Pandemic, the federal government suppressed all information regarding the new virus in an effort to 
maintain wartime morale; the U.S. had just entered World War I. There were directives for state and local 
governments to do that same. Even after mass graves for influenza victims had been constructed in 
Philadelphia, a local newspaper published “This is not a public health measure. There is no cause for 
alarm.” (Barry, 2004). As of March 27, 2020, there has been no coordinated federal response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
Conventional wisdom says, “all models are bad, but some are useful” (Box et al., 1987). Though it 
may not capture the true impact of a new influenza pandemic, this research certainly offers a useful model 
for pandemic influenza. And, it offers a new model, one that considers the separate effects of spatial 
vulnerability and socio-economic vulnerability on mortality during an influenza pandemic. Additionally, 
it provides a spatial assessment of vulnerability that can be actionable for use in vaccine distribution 
campaigns, intervention design, and containment efforts. This research contributes to a clearly identified 
gap in the literature, specifically, that no pandemic influenza preparedness plans discuss the location of 
individuals that may be most vulnerable during a pandemic. There currently is no other model defined in 
the literature that considers the integrated effects of population and place on mortality in such an explicit 
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way. Thus, we can consider the results of this research to be a type of best-case-scenario outcome of a 
worst-case-scenario event.  
FUTURE WORK 
The results of this research present a strong argument for continued and increasing research on 
pandemics and pandemic influenza, hospital surge capacity, spatial and socio-economic vulnerability, and 
mortality. It is evident that despite perceived advancements in health care delivery and population health 
since 1918, the outcome of such an event is not likely to be improved; in fact, it is likely to be worse.  
The spatio-temporal epidemiological model developed for this study could be refined in future studies 
for a variety of research objectives. An integration of agent-based modeling to reflect individual level 
movement through the study area could provide a more realistic simulation of disease transmission during 
a pandemic and provide more spatially explicit information detailing who is at risk, who becomes 
infected, and where. The health care facilities component of this model could be extended to include 
facilities without in-patient capacity where less severely afflicted individuals could go to receive care, or 
could be changed to a different service provision altogether to reflect capacity of the system to provide 
other care services such as testing and vaccine distribution. Additionally, incorporation of quarantines at 
varying geographic scales into the container boundaries of the capacitated shortest-distance allocation 
model would provide invaluable insight into the effects that quarantines can have on the spatial dynamics 
of transmission and care provision.  
This model can also be revised with infectivity parameters reflective of any infectious disease and 
applied to any geographic location. Because of this level of user-controlled inputs, it can be used to 
simulate pandemics of many different infectious diseases, as well as epidemics and outbreaks of all sizes, 





The original conclusion to this research was to emphasize the need for preparedness, so that when the 
next pandemic happens, we are more prepared. However, as stated in the discussion above, the “next” 
pandemic has already happened. During the academic year in which this thesis research was conducted, 
the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (responsible for the respiratory disease COVID-19) spilled over into 
humans and quickly began to transmit. Aided by the unprecedented level of global travel and lack of 
government-led response in a few select countries, it quickly emerged onto the global stage as the “next” 
pandemic. The hope for this research was that it would be incorporated into the existing pandemic 
preparedness plans as a way to identify the most vulnerable populations and the places that they live, so 
that the eventual public health response to a pandemic could be as effective as possible. Because so many 
of the plans rely on the development and distribution of a vaccine, an already precarious plan of action, 
the intention was that this research could lend some guidance as to where these vaccines should be 
distributed first, to maximize the efficacy of a limited number of vaccines. Additionally, this research was 
intended to highlight the potentially hazardous effects of competition for health care resources and the 
dangerous and deleterious effect that lack of health care in a region could have on the health of the 
population.  
However, in light of this new pandemic, the conclusions to be drawn from this research have changed 
dramatically. Hindsight is 20-20; in the public realm the importance of public health, specifically of 
pandemic research and preparedness, is now glaringly obvious. This research underscores this point. 
Unfortunately, this importance was not as obvious in recent years.  Bureaucratically, there was a shift 
away from emerging pathogen surveillance and pandemic research in the United States (The New York 
Times, 2019). This shift has resulted in a lack of coordination among agencies at different levels of 
governance and an overall lack of effective public health response, rendering the pandemic preparedness 
plans that do exist largely in-actionable. Thus, this research cannot be presented as a realistic method of 
refinement for any of these plans in preparation for the next pandemic. The “next” pandemic has already 
100 
happened, and it is clear that these plans were not written with account for their own disregard. This is not 
to say that this research should not one day be presented as a way to improve our plans; instead, there is a 
more pressing conclusion to this research to be discussed.  
The only real response to pandemic COVID-19 in the United States has been strong suggestions of 
social distancing, presented as an effort to protect the “most vulnerable” in the population by slowing 
transmission of the disease. However, we have no real way to know who is most vulnerable, or where 
they are. While not a perfect assessment of vulnerability, this research helps to fill that gap. By assessing 
vulnerability to mortality from pandemic influenza both spatially and socio-economically, it provides 
some guidance as to “where” people are vulnerable. The results of the socio-economic vulnerability 
modeling suggest that there is no socio-economic group that is more vulnerable to higher pandemic flu 
case-mortality rates than another; in other words, there is no basic protective level of income, education, 
or socio-economic status when it comes to mortality from pandemic influenza. Of course, specific factors 
like cost of medical care, and access to transportation to reach health care facilities, can influence one’s 
ability to get care and their health outcome in ways that this model cannot capture. However, the 
investigation of the relationship between these socio-economic indicators and mortality rate on a block 
group level demonstrate no clear increase in mortality rate as socio-economic vulnerability increases. The 
takeaway from this is not that people are less socio-economically vulnerable than we thought, but that 
when access to health care, competition for care, and demographic makeup of the population is 
considered, everyone is vulnerable, regardless of socio-economic status. With the understanding that 
socio-economic status is not strongly associated with increased mortality, the spatial vulnerability 
modeling portion of this research provides a map of where hotspots of increased case-mortality rates may 
be seen, when the demographic makeup of the population, access to health care, and competition for 
services are considered. It is evident from the results of this study that there are places that will bear a 
disproportionate burden of the impact of a pandemic, whether it be COVID-19 or an eventual novel 
influenza sometime in the future.  
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Now, instead of being a potential tool for plan improvement, this research can be considered a 
visualization of the potential outcome of a pandemic, whether it be influenza or some other virus. Some 
of the strongest messaging associated with the push for social distancing is that transmission of this virus 
needs to be slowed because the health care system might not be able to handle the surge in demand for 
care created by this new pandemic. It is not a question of whether or not the health care system can handle 
the surge; it cannot. The health care system of the United States is routinely overwhelmed by seasonal flu. 
A pandemic will absolutely overwhelm the system.  
The timeliness of this research cannot be overstated. The “next” pandemic has already arrived, and it 
is clear that the health care system of the United States is not equipped to handle it. This research provides 
evidence of the potential deadly impact of a pandemic when the health care system is unable to provide 
care at the magnitude demanded by a pandemic.  
To end this research on a positive note; however, it is important to remember how many people will 
remain healthy. These are the people who can help mitigate the deadly impact of an inadequate health 
care system. Though social distancing is not the only component of an effective pandemic response, it can 
help greatly limit the spread of the virus when other components of an effective response have not been 
realized. As the number of people who participate in social distancing climbs, so too will the number of 
prevented transmissions, and ultimately, the number of healthy people. The conclusion to this research is 
not all dire; it should serve as a motivation for individuals to be proactive about individual protective 
measures and social distancing during a pandemic to limit the overwhelm of the health care system. 
Together, individual actions create community level change. If enough people participate in these health 




Access to Care | Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH). (n.d.). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from 
https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/healthrankings/access-to-care.html 
American Hospital Directory—Hospital Statistics by State. (n.d.). Retrieved June 3, 2019, from 
https://www.ahd.com/state_statistics.html 
Andimann, W. (2018). Animals Viruses and Humans, A Narrow Divide: How Lethal Zoonotic Viruses ... - 
Warren A. Andiman—Google Books. 
Arcury, T., Gesler Wilbert M., Preisser John S., Sherman Jill, Spencer John, & Perin Jamie. (2005). The 
Effects of Geography and Spatial Behavior on Health Care Utilization among the Residents of a 
Rural Region. Health Services Research, 40(1), 135–156. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-
6773.2005.00346.x 
AuBuchon, A. (n.d.). ADPH Launches New Infectious Disease Network. Retrieved May 1, 2019, from 
https://www.apr.org/post/adph-launches-new-infectious-disease-network 




Barry, J. (2004). The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History. Pengiun Group. 
Bian, L., Huang, Y., Mao, L., Lim, E., Lee, G., Yang, Y., Cohen, M., & Wilson, D. (2012). Modeling 
Individual Vulnerability to Communicable Diseases: A Framework and Design. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 102(5), 1016–1025. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2012.674844 
Blumenshine, P., Reingold, A., Egerter, S., Mockenhaupt, R., Braveman, P., & Marks, J. (2008). 
Pandemic Influenza Planning in the United States from a Health Disparities Perspective. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 14(5), 709–715. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1405.071301 
Box, G. E. P., Draper, N. R., & Wüey, J. (n.d.). Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces. 7. 
Bradt, D. A., & Drummond, C. M. (2006). Avian influenza pandemic threat and health systems response. 
Emergency Medicine Australasia, 18(5–6), 430–443. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-
6723.2006.00906.x 
Brundage, J. F. (2006). Cases and Deaths During Influenza Pandemics in the United States. American 
Journal of Preventive Medicine, 31(3), 252–256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2006.04.005 
Bureau, U. S. C. (n.d.). 2016 Population Estimates. Retrieved November 14, 2017, from 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2016_PE
PANNRES&prodType=table 
Caldwell, J. T., Ford, C. L., Wallace, S. P., Wang, M. C., & Takahashi, L. M. (2016). Intersection of 
Living in a Rural Versus Urban Area and Race/Ethnicity in Explaining Access to Health Care in 
103 
the United States. American Journal of Public Health, 106(8), 1463–1469. 
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2016.303212 
Cavallo, J. J., Donoho, D. A., & Forman, H. P. (2020). Hospital Capacity and Operations in the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic—Planning for the Nth Patient. JAMA Health 
Forum, 1(3), e200345–e200345. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2020.0345 
CDC. (2019, June 11). 2009 H1N1 Pandemic. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/2009-h1n1-pandemic.html 
Chan, P. K. S. (2002). Outbreak of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus Infection in Hong Kong in 1997. 
Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34(Supplement_2), S58–S64. https://doi.org/10.1086/338820 
Comber, A. J., Brunsdon, C., & Radburn, R. (2011). A spatial analysis of variations in health access: 
Linking geography, socio-economic status and access perceptions. International Journal of 
Health Geographics, 10, 44. https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-072X-10-44 
Crum-Cianflone, N. F., Blair, P. J., Faix, D., Arnold, J., Echols, S., Sherman, S. S., Tueller, J. E., 
Warkentien, T., Sanguineti, G., Bavaro, M., & Hale, B. R. (2009). Clinical and Epidemiologic 
Characteristics of an Outbreak of Novel H1N1 (Swine Origin) Influenza A Virus among United 
States Military Beneficiaries. Clinical Infectious Diseases : An Official Publication of the 
Infectious Diseases Society of America, 49(12), 1801–1810. https://doi.org/10.1086/648508 
Daugherty, E. L., Carlson, A. L., & Perl, T. M. (2010). Planning for the Inevitable: Preparing for 
Epidemic and Pandemic Respiratory Illness in the Shadow of H1N1 Influenza. Clinical Infectious 
Diseases, 50(8), 1145–1154. https://doi.org/10.1086/651272 
Davis, D. P., Poste, J. C., Hicks, T., Polk, D., Rymer, T. E., & Jacoby, I. (2005). Hospital Bed Surge 
Capacity in the Event of a Mass-Casualty Incident. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 20(3), 
169–176. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049023X00002405 
Delamater, P. L. (2013). Spatial accessibility in suboptimally configured health care systems: A modified 
two-step floating catchment area (M2SFCA) metric. Health & Place, 24(Supplement C), 30–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2013.07.012 
Dorjee, S., Poljak, Z., Revie, C. W., Bridgland, J., McNab, B., Leger, E., & Sanchez, J. (2013). A Review 
of Simulation Modelling Approaches Used for the Spread of Zoonotic Influenza Viruses in 
Animal and Human Populations. Zoonoses and Public Health, 60(6), 383–411. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/zph.12010 
Dubos, R. J. (1987). Mirage of Health: Utopias, Progress and Biological Change. Rutgers University 
Press. 
Emch, M., Root, E. D., & Carrel, M. (2017). Health and Medical Geography, Fourth Edition. Guilford 
Publications. 
Esteban-Vasallo, M. D., Domínguez-Berjón, M. F., Aerny-Perreten, N., Astray-Mochales, J., Martín-
Martínez, F., & Gènova-Maleras, R. (2012). Pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 in Madrid, 
Spain: Incidence and characteristics in immigrant and native population. European Journal of 
Public Health, 22(6), 792–796. Scopus. https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/ckr171 
104 
Facing looming capacity, Austin hospitals prepare for overcrowding of COVID-19 patients | KXAN.com. 
(n.d.). Retrieved March 27, 2020, from https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/facing-looming-
capacity-austin-hospitals-prepare-for-overcrowding-of-covid-19-patients/ 
Franks, P., Clancy, C. M., & Gold, M. R. (1993). Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence From a 
National Cohort. JAMA, 270(6), 737–741. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1993.03510060083037 
Frost, W. H. (1919). THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF INFLUENZA. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 73(5), 313–318. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1919.02610310007003 
Frost, W. H. (1920). Statistics of Influenza Morbidity: With Special Reference to Certain Factors in Case 
Incidence and Case Fatality. Public Health Reports (1896-1970), 35(11), 584–597. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/4575511 
Frost, W. H., & Sydenstricker, E. (1919). Influenza in Maryland: Preliminary Statistics of Certain 
Localities. Public Health Reports (1896-1970), 34(11), 491–504. https://doi.org/10.2307/4575056 
Gagnon, A., Miller, M. S., Hallman, S. A., Bourbeau, R., Herring, D. A., Earn, D. J., & Madrenas, J. 
(2013). Age-Specific Mortality During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Unravelling the Mystery of 
High Young Adult Mortality. PLOS ONE, 8(8), e69586. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0069586 
Gelberg, L., Andersen, R. M., & Leake, B. D. (2000). The Behavioral Model for Vulnerable Populations: 
Application to medical care use and outcomes for homeless people. Health Services Research, 
34(6), 1273–1302. 
Georgia Covid-19 cases rise as Atlanta mayor warns hospitals are at capacity | US news | The Guardian. 
(n.d.). Retrieved March 27, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/mar/27/us-
coronavirus-outbreak-georgia-hospitals-atlanta 
Germann, T. C., Kadau, K., Longini, I. M., & Macken, C. A. (2006). Mitigation strategies for pandemic 
influenza in the United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(15), 5935–
5940. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0601266103 
Greer, A. L., Tuite, A., & Fisman, D. N. (2010). Age, influenza pandemics and disease dynamics. 
Epidemiology and Infection, 138(11), 1542–1549. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268810000579 
Guagliardo, M. F. (2004). Spatial accessibility of primary care: Concepts, methods and challenges. 
International Journal of Health Geographics, 3, 3. https://doi.org/10.1186/1476-072X-3-3 
Hansen, W. G. (1959). How Accessibility Shapes Land Use. Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, 25(2), 73–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/01944365908978307 
How Flu Spreads | Seasonal Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, October 5). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/spread.htm 
How Is Pandemic Flu Different from Seasonal Flu? | Pandemic Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, April 7). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/basics/about.html 
Huff, D. L. (1963). A Probabilistic Analysis of Shopping Center Trade Areas. Land Economics, 39(1), 
81–90. https://doi.org/10.2307/3144521 
105 
Huff, D. L. (1964). Defining and Estimating a Trading Area. Journal of Marketing, 28(3), 34–38. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1249154 
Influenza (Flu) | North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services. (n.d.). Retrieved November 
5, 2017, from http://www.flu.nc.gov/ 
Influenza (Flu) Viruses | Seasonal Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, October 5). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/index.htm 
Joseph, A. E., & Bantock, P. R. (1982). Measuring potential physical accessibility to general practitioners 
in rural areas: A method and case study. Social Science & Medicine, 16(1), 85–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(82)90428-2 
Karlamangla, S. (2018). Severe flu brings medicine shortages, packed ERs and a rising death toll in 
California. Latimes.Com. http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-flu-surge-20180106-
htmlstory.html 
Kolata, G. (2001). Flu: The Story Of The Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus 
that Caused It. Simon and Schuster. 
KTVZ. (2019, March 14). No vacancy: Severe flu has St. Charles hospitals full. KTVZ. 
https://www.ktvz.com/news/no-vacancy-severe-flu-has-st-charles-hospitals-full/1058746292 
Lackie, J. (2010). A Dictionary of Biomedicine. OUP Oxford. 
Lemaitre, M., & Carrat, F. (2010). Comparative age distribution of influenza morbidity and mortality 
during seasonal influenza epidemics and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. BMC Infectious Diseases, 10, 
162. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2334-10-162 
Levy, N. S., Nguyen, T. Q., Westheimer, E., & Layton, M. (2013). Disparities in the severity of influenza 
illness: A descriptive study of hospitalized and nonhospitalized novel H1N1 influenza-positive 
patients in New York city: 2009-2010 influenza season. Journal of Public Health Management 
and Practice, 19(1), 16–24. Scopus. https://doi.org/10.1097/PHH.0b013e31824155a2 
Luo, J. (2014). Integrating the Huff Model and Floating Catchment Area Methods to Analyze Spatial 
Access to Healthcare Services. Transactions in GIS, 18(3), 436–448. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/tgis.12096 
Luo, W., & Wang, F. (2003). Measures of Spatial Accessibility to Health Care in a GIS Environment: 
Synthesis and a Case Study in the Chicago Region. Environment and Planning B: Planning and 
Design, 30(6), 865–884. https://doi.org/10.1068/b29120 
Mastroianni, A. C. (2009). Slipping through the net: Social vulnerability in pandemic planning. Hastings 
Center Report, 39(5), 11–12. Scopus. https://doi.org/10.1353/hcr.0.0186 
Meade, M. S. (1977). Medical Geography as Human Ecology: The Dimension of Population Movement. 
Geographical Review, 67(4), 379–393. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/213623 
Medina, R. A., Manicassamy, B., Stertz, S., Seibert, C. W., Hai, R., Belshe, R. B., Frey, S. E., Basler, C. 
F., Palese, P., & García-Sastre, A. (2010). Pandemic 2009 H1N1 vaccine protects against 1918 
106 
Spanish influenza       virus. Nature Communications, 1(3), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1026 
Menon, D. K., Taylor, B. L., Ridley, S. A., & on behalf of the Intensive Care Society, U. (2005). 
Modelling the impact of an influenza pandemic on critical care services in England. Anaesthesia, 
60(10), 952–954. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2044.2005.04372.x 
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., Altman, D. G., & Group, T. P. (2009). Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PLOS Medicine, 6(7), 
e1000097. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000097 
Monto, A. S., Comanor, L., Shay, D. K., & Thompson, W. W. (2006). Epidemiology of Pandemic 
Influenza: Use of Surveillance and Modeling for Pandemic Preparedness. The Journal of 
Infectious Diseases, 194(Supplement_2), S92–S97. https://doi.org/10.1086/507559 
Morens, D. M., & Fauci, A. S. (2007). The 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Insights for the 21st Century. The 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, 195(7), 1018–1028. https://doi.org/10.1086/511989 
National Academies of Sciences, E., Division, H. and M., Practice, B. on P. H. and P. H., States, C. on C.-
B. S. to P. H. E. in the U., Baciu, A., Negussie, Y., Geller, A., & Weinstein, J. N. (2017). The 
State of Health Disparities in the United States. In Communities in Action: Pathways to Health 
Equity. National Academies Press (US). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK425844/ 
Osterholm, M. T. (2005). Preparing for the Next Pandemic. New England Journal of Medicine, 352(18), 
1839–1842. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp058068 
O’Sullivan. (2010). (19) (PDF) Vulnerability in an Influenza Pandemic: Looking Beyond Medical Risk. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282817477_Vulnerability_in_an_Influenza_Pandemic_
Looking_Beyond_Medical_Risk 
Pandemic Influenza | Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH). (n.d.). Retrieved March 27, 2020, 
from http://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/pandemicflu/ 
Past Pandemics | Pandemic Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, November 2). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/basics/past-pandemics.html 
Pérez-Trallero, E., Piñeiro, L., Vicente, D., Montes, M., & Cilla, G. (2009). Residual immunity in older 
people against the influenza A(H1N1) – recent experience in northern Spain. Eurosurveillance, 
14(39), 19344. https://doi.org/10.2807/ese.14.39.19344-en 
Quammen, D. (2012). Spillover: Animal Infections and the Next Human Pandemic. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Richardson, L. D., & Norris, M. (2010). Access to Health and Health Care: How Race and Ethnicity 
Matter. Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine: A Journal of Translational and Personalized Medicine, 
77(2), 166–177. https://doi.org/10.1002/msj.20174 
Riley, W. J. (2012). Health Disparities: Gaps in Access, Quality and Affordability of Medical Care. 
Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association, 123, 167–174. 
107 
Rothman, K. (2008). Modern Epidemiology—Kenneth J. Rothman, Sander Greenland—Google Books. 
https://books.google.com/books/about/Modern_Epidemiology.html?id=bt9nQgAACAAJ&source
=kp_book_description 
Scientists Were Hunting for the Next Ebola. Now the U.S. Has Cut Off Their Funding. - The New York 
Times. (n.d.). Retrieved March 27, 2020, from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/health/predict-usaid-viruses.html 
Seasonal Influenza, More Information | Seasonal Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, October 13). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm 
Smith, M. J., Bernard, C., Rossiter, K., Sahni, S., & Silva, D. (2010). Vulnerability: A contentious and 
fluid term. The Hastings Center Report, 40(1), 5–6. https://doi.org/10.1353/hcr.0.0233 
Stedman, T. L. (2005). Stedman’s Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing. Lippincott 
Williams & Wilkins. 
Stephenson, N., Davis, M., Flowers, P., MacGregor, C., & Waller, E. (2014). Mobilising “vulnerability” 
in the public health response to pandemic influenza. Social Science & Medicine, 102, 10–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.11.031 
Timpka, T., Eriksson, H., Strömgren, M., Eriksson, O., Ekberg, J., Grimvall, A., Nyce, J., Gursky, E., & 
Holm, E. (2010). A neighborhood susceptibility index for planning of local physical interventions 
in response to pandemic influenza outbreaks. AMIA ... Annual Symposium Proceedings. AMIA 
Symposium, 2010, 792–796. 
Tolbert, J., Orgera, K., Singer, N., Dec 13, A. D. P., & 2019. (2019, December 13). Key Facts about the 
Uninsured Population. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ 
Treatment | Seasonal Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (n.d.). Retrieved February 10, 2018, from 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/consumer/treatment.htm 
Tumpey, T. M., Basler, C. F., Aguilar, P. V., Zeng, H., Solórzano, A., Swayne, D. E., Cox, N. J., Katz, J. 
M., Taubenberger, J. K., Palese, P., & García-Sastre, A. (2005). Characterization of the 
Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science, 310(5745), 77–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1119392 
Types of Influenza Viruses | Seasonal Influenza (Flu) | CDC. (2017, September 27). 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/types.htm 
U.S. Homeland Security Council. (n.d.-a). National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. 
U.S. Homeland Security Council. (n.d.-b). National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation 
Plan. 
WEBSTER, G. R., & BOWMAN, J. (2008). Quantitatively Delineating the Black Belt Geographic 
Region. Southeastern Geographer, 48(1), 3–18. JSTOR. 
Westreich, D. (2019). Epidemiology by Design: A Causal Approach to the Health Sciences. Oxford 
University Press. 
108 
WHO | FAQs: H5N1 influenza. (n.d.). WHO. Retrieved April 2, 2019, from 
https://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/avian_influenza/h5n1_research/faqs/en/ 
WHO | Push needed for pandemic planning. (n.d.). WHO. Retrieved April 2, 2019, from 
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/11/12-021112/en/ 
WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19—11 March 2020. (n.d.). 
Retrieved March 27, 2020, from https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-
opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 
Wong, K. C., Luscombe, G. M., & Hawke, C. (2019). Influenza infections in Australia 2009-2015: Is 
there a combined effect of age and sex on susceptibility to virus subtypes? BMC Infectious 
Diseases, 19(1), 42. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12879-019-3681-4 
Woo, G. (2019). Age-dependence of the 1918 pandemic. British Actuarial Journal, 24. Scopus. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357321719000023 
Woodul, R. L., Delamater, P. L., & Emch, M. (2019). Hospital surge capacity for an influenza pandemic 
in the triangle region of North Carolina. Spatial and Spatio-Temporal Epidemiology, 30, 100285. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sste.2019.100285 
 
 
